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ABSTRACT

The development of minimum standards in higher education through the evolution of accreditation in specialized disciplines, and standard setting in criminology and criminal justice education are examined. The very different experiences with the concept of accreditation encountered in the fields of public administration and law are considered. Law is an established profession that achieved a mechanism of specialized accreditation largely controlled by an organization of practitioners, while public administration is a somewhat diverse field in which attempts are still being made to achieve accreditation standards administered and controlled by professional schools. Developments of immediate concern to the constituency of the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards are addressed. The growth of criminology and criminal justice in an academic setting and the major problem areas directly related to the questions of evaluation and accreditation in these fields are considered. The literature indicates that there are strong differences of opinion on questions concerning the fundamental direction higher education in this area should take. Academic are even divided in their opinions of what general objectives educational programs should attempt to address: the needs of the present or future criminal justice administrator, the policy-maker, the researcher, the academic, or the line officer? It is suggested that evaluation efforts depend on decision-making concerning the preferred curriculum/curricula, and that problems regarding criminal justice education stem from the broad spectrum of programs covered. A bibliography is appended. (SW)

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Antony E. Simpson

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Preface

The issue of quality in criminology and criminal justice higher education cuts across many boundaries within the educational environment, as well as the various components of the criminal justice system. The concept of higher education for a career in criminal justice is not new, but the rapid expansion of programs in criminal justice is largely a phenomenon of the past decade. This rapid expansion has caused more than minor concern, prompting much criticism, many hypotheses, and a host of recommendations for change. Unfortunately, the lack of thorough research related to postsecondary programs in criminology and criminal justice makes it difficult to make sound decisions based on fact, rather than speculations based on perception.

The Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards consists of members from the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and the American Society of Criminology. The primary goal of the commission is to study and explore issues related to minimum criteria in criminology and criminal justice higher education. A number of ongoing research projects are directed toward the development of a comprehensive data base that will provide decision-makers with the information necessary for sound planning and development. The following literature review, prepared by Antony Simpson of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, traces the development of minimum standards in higher education through the evolution of accreditation in specialized disciplines. The review contrasts the development of standard setting in two professional disciplines and provides insight into the current state of development in criminology and criminal justice education.

Professor Simpson indicates in his introduction that the views expressed in this volume are his own, and it should be noted that they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Commission. Whether there should be accreditation for programs in criminal justice and/or criminology is an issue the commission has not yet addressed. Through research, publication of findings, and a broadly based dialog, we hope it will be possible to chart a course for the future. Professor Simpson identifies many of the issues at the heart of the controversy concerning minimum criteria in criminology and criminal justice education.

Richard H. Ward
Project Director

Introduction

The account that follows represents the result of an effort to review current trends, as these are revealed in the literature, of interest to those concerned with the evaluation and possible accreditation of postsecondary educational programs in criminology and criminal justice. Because these trends are varied and stem from developments within many areas of higher education, the subject matter of this discussion is necessarily quite broad.

Chapter I reviews the development of accreditation as a distinctive characteristic of the American system of education. Chapter II includes an account of the very different experiences with the concept of accreditation encountered in the fields of public administration and law. This chapter is presented with the objective of documenting the dissimilar paths different fields of study have taken in this context. Law, as an established profession that long ago achieved a mechanism of specialized accreditation largely controlled by an organization of practitioners, is contrasted with public administration. This last is a developing, if somewhat diverse, field in which recent attempts have been, and are being, made to achieve accreditation standards administered and controlled by professional schools. As public administration is probably just a few years ahead of criminology and criminal justice in this respect, its experiences provide considerable food for thought.

Only Chapters III and IV address developments of immediate concern to the constituency of the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards. Chapter III presents an overview of the growth of criminology and criminal justice in an academic setting. Chapter IV discusses the major problem areas directly related to the questions of evaluation and accreditation in these fields.

Due to the broad scope of the subjects addressed, and the great volume of published material bearing upon each of them, only a very selective review of the literature is given here. A comprehensive annotated bibliography dealing with the topics considered in Chapters III and IV is currently being prepared by members of the Joint Commission staff and will be completed by March 1979.

In part because of the selectivity of the coverage given in this account, but primarily because of the nature of its subject matter, the discussion given here may not be acceptable to all. Recent developments in higher education in this area are dramatic and analyses of them arouse strong feelings. While the author has, in accordance with his brief, attempted to review these developments fairly and dispassionately, only the blandest of narratives could have ensured that no viewpoint would be offended.

For the choice of published accounts surveyed here, and for the assessments and interpretations of them, the author accepts full responsibility.

Chapter I

Accreditation in American Higher Education: Problems and Perspectives

Accreditation as a means of documenting those institutions of higher education that meet acceptable academic standards exists as a uniquely American phenomenon. The immediate function of the accrediting movement is, and has been, to provide some form of quality control in an area that traditionally has not been accountable to centralized governmental authority (Blauch 1959).

Origins

In the last half of the nineteenth century, the then federal Department of Education initiated what became a movement toward accreditation by publishing lists of institutions of higher education for public consumption. However, the role of the federal government in this movement should not be overemphasized, because the lists that were published were just that and did not include any ratings of the institutions covered. Any college authorized to award degrees of any kind qualified for inclusion (Sanders 1959a; Zook and Haggerty 1936). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal authorities avoided any formal involvement in the creation of structures designed to encourage the maintenance of standards in this area. In their place, a number of private associations began to carry out something approaching this, motivated by a mixture of reasons: "Fear of government [intervention] in educational affairs and yet a realization that there must be some means of educational control and guidance produced the accrediting agency" (Zook 1934: 17).

The six regional associations that emerged from this period (and flourish as the principal agencies through which accreditation is awarded today) began by setting minimal standards for the admission of new institutions, but initially did not have formal processes of accreditation. Such processes were instituted by each of the six associations in turn and, since 1952, all have issued regularly revised lists of the institutions they accredit.

A considerable impetus to the accreditation movement was provided in 1914, when the Association of American Universities published its first list of approved colleges. Publication of this list was undertaken in this year be-

cause of the difficulties experienced by American students attempting to enroll for graduate work in European universities. As no yardstick for gauging the academic attainment of these students existed in the early 1900s, many German universities, in particular, adopted policies of only accepting those who had obtained their baccalaureates from member institutions of the AAU. The association's first list was prepared in an effort to avoid unfairness to colleges with standards up to those of members of the AAU, but unable to provide documentation of this (Dickey 1971; Sanders 1959a). For more than thirty years, the association was the only national body accrediting undergraduate institutions. In 1948, however, it resigned from this role, on the grounds that it wished to reaffirm its major interest in education at the graduate level.

For many years, the accreditation processes of the six regional agencies were coordinated by two organizations: the Federation of Regional Accrediting Commissions of Higher Education and the National Commission on Accrediting. The federation was an organization composed of the higher education commissions of the six agencies and acted to promote

the exchange of information, experience, and personnel among the constituent commissions, and provides means of communication and cooperation among them. . . .

The Federation's general aim is to establish a national consensus on accrediting in higher education for regional application. Institutions of higher education are accredited by the six regional accrediting agencies and are provided with consultative and other services through the commissions which constitute the Federation. All institutions of higher education accredited by the six regional agencies are endorsed and recognized for national accreditation by the Federation.

The endorsement and recognition of regional accrediting by the Federation reflects the long-standing reciprocity among the regional associations with respect to recognition of accredited status. That is to say, accreditation of an institution by one regional agency has long been accepted and respected in the other regions as evidence that the institution's performance in the accomplishment of its purposes is satisfactory ("Accreditation" 1969: 207).

The National Commission on Accrediting existed as an organization independent from the federation, but worked closely with it to ensure that standards of accreditation that were applied were in conformity with one another and were appropriate for the attainment of the objectives of accreditation. In 1975, the two groups merged to form the Council on Postsecondary Education (COPA), which now acts as the principal agency of control over the policies, standards, and objectives of the various accrediting agencies.

COPA works to foster and facilitate the role of accrediting agencies in promoting and insuring the quality and diversity of American postsecondary education. The accrediting agencies, while established and supported by their membership, are intended to serve the broader interests of society as well. To achieve these ends, COPA recognizes, coordinates, and periodically reviews the work of recognized accrediting agencies, determines the appropriateness of existing or proposed accrediting agencies and their activities and performs other related functions (Council on Postsecondary Education 1977: 320).

While the regional agencies examine the individual programs, at both the graduate and undergraduate levels, of institutions under examination, their stated object of concern is to determine the qualifications of these institutions *in toto*. Accreditation is awarded, or denied or withdrawn, to a college or university as a whole and not to individual programs or schools within it. Accreditation of particular professional programs is delegated by COPA to appropriate institutional associations operating at the national level.

Professional accreditation began at about the same time that steps were being taken to grant formal recognition of minimal standards of achievement at the institutional level. The pioneering moves in this area were in the field of medicine, which saw the establishment of basic standards for medical schools in 1905. That year, the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals, an arm of the American Medical Association, issued a preliminary set of standards and, in addition, published a rating of existing medical schools based on the performances of their graduates in licensing examinations. A few years later, following the publication of Abraham Flexner's classic and widely quoted study of the state of medical education in the United States and Canada, the AMA standards were revised and closure of inferior schools resulted from their rigorous implementation (Sanders 1959a). Other recognized professions quickly followed the example of the American Medical Association and, by the beginning of World War II, professional associations in the fields of dentistry, law, engineering, and pharmacy had established national control over educational training for admission to their ranks.

More recently, there has been an accelerating level of interest in specialized accreditation on the part of occupations aspiring toward professional status (Herrell 1974). This upsurge of interest is consistent with a now well-established trend toward increased credentialing in American society. The overt concern of this movement, and of the organizations that support it, is to upgrade the status and expertise of various occupational groups and thereby to protect the consumer by assuring him a minimal level of competence in his dealings with this group. For some time, however, strong opinion has supported the view that this movement does not always act in the interests of the consumer or of society at large. Authorities such as Orlans (1974) discuss the "fatuity of credentialing everyone and everything" and of the limitations inherent in attempts to guarantee quality of performance by application of formal standards. Lieberman (1970) in elaborating on his thesis of the increasing dangers of the American public's being subject to "the tyranny of the experts," suggests that increased professional control over occupations is usually justified by the sometimes inaccurate assumption that what is good for an occupational group is good for those who consume its services. He points out that in allowing such groups a virtual monopoly over who is to be admitted into their ranks, society runs the risk of having policies national in their impact subordinated to private, rather than public, interests.

Discussion of the many difficulties involved in both general and specialized accreditation must be undertaken in the context of a consideration of what objectives a set of accreditation procedures should be designed to attain and the probably more difficult question of what methods and criteria for evaluation should be applied to determine whether a given series of objectives has

been reached. Before reviewing the difficulties that have emerged in published discussion of these questions, one further characteristic of the American system of accreditation must be documented. This is the essentially nongovernmental nature of the accreditation process and its strangely ambiguous relationship with activities carried out by the federal government.

Accreditation by voluntary nongovernmental agencies arose, in fact, because of the unwillingness of federal authorities to involve themselves in this function. As mentioned earlier, the Association of American Universities only assumed responsibility for putting its seal of approval as a means of protecting graduates of its member institutions. In fact, this function was undertaken only after repeated attempts had been made to persuade the then U.S. Bureau of Education to perform it. These attempts were distinguished by their lack of success (Sanders 1959a, 1959b).

Federal authorities have, however, been closely concerned with the principle of accreditation, and with its application, from the very beginning. In 1915, a committee was formed by the Bureau of Education to consider the advisability of compiling and publishing classified lists of colleges and to assess the procedures that might be used to gather the desired information. Although the conclusion reached by this committee did not favor more active federal involvement in such matters, the published report went a long way toward the development and refinement of evaluation procedures (Capen 1918). Some twenty years later, the Office of Education was persuaded by outside opinion to appoint an advisory committee to study the question of whether the office should participate in a more official capacity in the development of standards that could then be applied to the accreditation of colleges and universities by state governments. The report emerging from this committee clearly favored the position that responsibility for accreditation of postsecondary institutions should logically rest at the state level. Neither the federal government nor private organizations should, it was felt, attempt to assume what was essentially a state obligation (Kelly 1940).

The Federal Role

For most of this century, up to the early 1950s, the most obvious product of federal involvement in this area has been its publication of the annual directory (*Education Directory: Part 3, Higher Education*), listing those academic institutions either accredited by nationally recognized accrediting agencies, operated under governmental auspices, or recognized for purposes of credit transfer by three or more accredited institutions. In this way, the federal government can be considered as having contributed toward the accreditation process by its policies of determining what constituted a "national recognized accrediting agency" (Sanders 1959b).

This situation exists today. However, the responsibilities of federal authorities toward the entire question of quality control in higher education have been subject to considerable discussion and refinement by policy changes resulting from a body of legislation beginning with the enactment of the Korean War G.I. Bill (P.L. 82-550; 66 Stat. 663 [1952]). Developments from this period to the early 1970s are documented in detail in Dickey and Miller

(1972), Finkin (1973), Sanders (1959b), and Selden (1960) and in hearings before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1974 (U.S. Senate 1974). The following brief analysis relies heavily on these sources.

The Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, popularly known as the Korean War G.I. Bill, was enacted in response to difficulties that had been experienced in funding educational programs for ex-servicemen after World War II and the Korean War. In both instances, existing state controls were found to have been insufficient to prevent widespread abuse of such funds by institutions of doubtful integrity. Although the difficulties encountered were largely in the areas of technical and other occupational training, and not in higher education *per se*, provision was made in the act for making the federal government more responsible for ascertaining the quality of education given in the colleges and universities to which it gave funds.

In essence, the Korean G.I. Bill mandated that federal funds be made available only to institutions of higher education accredited by organizations deemed to be nationally recognized for this purpose. The Commissioner of Education was formally charged with publishing a list of these organizations, together with the criteria used in its preparation:

On September 17, 1952, the Commissioner . . . published the criteria, developed after "consultation with an advisory group of educators," for recognition as a national accrediting agency. These required *inter alia* that: the scope of the organization be national or regional (i.e., encompassing several states); it serve a definite need; it perform no function that might prejudice its independent judgment; it make available to the public current information on its standards, operations and accredited programs and institutions; it only accredit institutions which are found on examination to meet pre-established standards; it has some experience in accrediting; and, it has gained general acceptance of its criteria and decisions. In addition, five procedural requirements were set out concerning the acquisition of information, use of qualified visitors, financial stability and re-evaluation (Finkin 1973: 347).

The effect of this act was clearly to state an obligation on the part of the federal government. However, the structure of the process of accreditation was in no way changed. Private agencies continued to be the principal vehicles through which accreditation was awarded or withheld and the act can, in fact, be interpreted as official recognition of the integral role these agencies occupied.

Legislation enacted between 1953 and 1972 (the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, the NDEA Amendments of 1964, the Nurse Training Act of 1964, the Higher Education Act of 1965, and the Education Amendments of 1972, in particular) continued to support the principle that the proper place for control of accreditation was in the hands of appropriate agencies in the private sphere. Although the net effect of these acts was to permit more direct federal control in situations where such agencies did not appear to exist, the general principle implicit in the Korean G.I. Bill was in no sense eroded.

In spite of this, some tightening of the criteria, established in the 1952 act, by which the government assessed the qualifications of accrediting agencies

and the procedures they used in the accreditation process occurred in 1969. By administrative decree, the Office of Education increased the rigorosity of the existing process and at the same time charged accrediting agencies with providing support to institutions during the self-study phase of their application and with undertaking leadership in enforcing and encouraging ethical practices within the institutions with which they dealt.

Governmental action in the last few years has reinforced this trend. Administrative regulations mandating even stricter controls over federal funds allocated to higher education have been revised a number of times over the years, to the satisfaction of some, but to the general dissatisfaction of college administrators (Roark 1978).

At the present time, two structural elements in the accreditation movement, which both seem likely to persist, can be isolated. The federal government, motivated largely, but not entirely, by concern with the administration of public funds, is exercising greater control over the operations of institutions of higher education in general. Concurrently, as more and more institutions become concerned with demonstrating their commitment to academic standards, and as an increasingly number of upwardly mobile occupational groups seek professional status, the influence of the various nongovernmental accrediting agencies is also increasing.

Critiques of Accreditation

Critics of the present system of accreditation can conveniently be classified into two groups: those who contend that the system itself is a reasonable one, but that the agencies involved in it have failed to apply it properly, and those who argue that the existing structure permits the agencies concerned to act in their own, rather than in the public, interest. Those in the first category maintain that the present system could profitably be retained, albeit with many, and perhaps drastic, changes. Those in the second usually advocate a move either toward the entire abolition of accreditation in any form or direct and rigorous control over all processes of accreditation by the federal government itself.

A basic element in this debate is a consideration of what the principal objectives of accreditation are, and how these can be translated into policies and evaluation procedures that can reasonably be expected to gauge the progress made by institutions toward achieving them. Even in terms of definition and broad statements of purpose, there have been various interpretations of what the accreditation concept implies.

Early definitions tended to focus upon strict adherence to a set of standards imposed and regulated by an external body. Such definitions, which can still be found in the recent literature, incline toward the use of accreditation primarily as a means of satisfying standards set by a qualified group. For example, as defined in an influential publication of the U.S. Office of Education: "Accreditation, as applied in education, is the recognition accorded to an institution that meets the standards or criteria established by a competent agency or association. Its general purpose is to promote and insure high quality in educational programs" (Blauch 1959: 3). More recent definitions

have, on the other hand, taken more pains to emphasize the role of the accrediting agencies in protecting the consumer, and the public interest in general, rather than that of ensuring adherence to some abstract set of institutional standards. The Council on Postsecondary Accreditation, for example, uses a definition that stresses the public function of the accreditation process:

Accreditation is a process of recognizing educational institutions *in toto* and various professional programs they offer *in parte* for performance, integrity and quality which entitle them to the confidence of the educational community and the public. In the United States this recognition is extended largely through nongovernmental voluntary institutional or professional associations which have responsibility for establishing criteria, visiting and evaluating institutions at their request, and approving those institutions which meet their criteria (1977: 319).

The many variant definitions appearing in the literature (many of which are reviewed in Gajewsky 1973) reflect this present tendency to define the accreditation process in such a way as to indicate the delicately balanced functions of preserving standards, protecting the consumer and the taxpayer, and yet encouraging the development of new and potentially valuable educational programs and techniques.

Statements of the purpose of accreditation generally follow this tendency to attribute a multiplicity of functions to the concept, but without incorporating guarantees of performance from its application:

Historically and currently institutional accreditation at the postsecondary level is intended to: Foster excellence in postsecondary institutions through the development of criteria and guidelines for assessing educational effectiveness; encourage institutional improvement through continuous self-study and planning; and assure the educational community, the general public, and other agencies or organizations that an institution has clearly defined and appropriate objectives, maintains conditions under which their achievement can reasonably be expected, appears in fact to be accomplishing them substantially, and can be expected to continue to do so (Kirkwood 1974: 225).

The sentences that follow this definition are significant in that they highlight one recent problem with the present system, one hinted at earlier in this discussion: "Notice that eligibility is not listed among the purposes of institutional accreditation. . . . A very important point to be made at this juncture is that there is an important distinction between accreditation and eligibility. The regional accrediting commissions grant accreditation; they do not grant eligibility for participation in Federal funding programs" (Kirkwood 1974: 225).

Regardless of this distinction, it is apparent that the federal government has traditionally relied heavily on the activities of the various accrediting agencies to establish eligibility and only in situations where the accrediting agencies do not have clear jurisdiction has the government taken the initiative in assessing eligibility through its own activities. Because of this, there has been widespread unhappiness with the heavy reliance on nongovernmental institutions to assist in the implementation of policies that have a national

impact and involve the expenditure of federal funds.

There is, in addition, ample evidence that the agencies themselves have not been altogether comfortable in this role. In a statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Education, the then Executive Director of the National Commission on Accrediting was quite forceful in his criticism of the existing relationship between these nongovernmental agencies and the federal government:

[A]ccrediting organizations have been enticed to become reluctant extensions of the U.S. Office of Education in order that the accredited schools, programs, and colleges might share the largesse writ large. Many would like now to break off the relationship . . . in order to return to the prerogative which historically and professionally has belonged to them—that of promoting and insuring quality education (Dickey 1974: 222).

Since these remarks were made, there have, in fact, been many indications that the federal authorities have gained a certain amount of ground in establishing controls over educational quality that act independently from those maintained by the accrediting agencies. These controls are primarily included in a series of progressively more detailed regulations over how colleges should administer federally funded student aid programs. The latest group of such regulations, published in the *Federal Register* on August 10, 14, and 24, 1978, mandate colleges to maintain records and statistics that many institutions feel will be costly to keep and of questionable value in the educational process. One regulation in particular requires recipient institutions to demonstrate that students receiving such funds demonstrate "satisfactory academic progress." Although this, too, is apparently not a popular concept in educational circles (Roark 1978), it can be taken to represent a trend for the federal government to increase its interest in matters hitherto left to the various accrediting agencies.

The problems of the accreditation movement, however, stem from many quarters and the present system has been criticized for, among other things, its failure to act as an effective clearinghouse for information of value to the public (Koerner 1970), failure to update the standards applied (Pugsley 1971), and inability to justify the reliability of these standards (Ward 1970).

In addition to these apparent characteristics of the accreditation movement, there are a number of current trends that raise serious questions about the ability of the present system to cope with present and future demands that are likely to be made on it. The most pressing of these revolve round increasing concern with the direct assessment of the achievements of higher education.

Harris cites three related trends and pressures underlying this concern:

1. The widespread questioning of the credibility of college degrees and a general public impression that a qualification from an accredited institution does not guarantee an acceptable level of competence in a graduate.

2. As the number and scope of nontraditional educational programs have grown, the limitations of standardized accreditation procedures have become apparent. On the one hand, it is clear that the criteria applied in these procedures are potentially inhibiting to the various experimental programs

that have grown up on campuses across the country. On the other, acceptance of such programs would constitute a tacit admission that the structures and processes traditionally used to evaluate higher education do not have universal application.

3. The trend toward competency-based education, which has affected educational institutions from grade-school level through graduate school, is both a cause and an effect of the pressures cited above. As a movement, the focus of competency-based education is on outcomes, and has more interest in the demonstrable, and quantifiable, skills developed by a graduate than in the structures and processes through which these skills were acquired (Harris 1978).

A further pressure cited by many as a contribution to the popularity of the movement toward external assessment is the traditional lack of emphasis on evaluation of programs as such in the accreditation process. For example, one study of problems of accreditation and evaluation in teacher education describes how the *form* of an educational program is frequently emphasized at the expense of substance:

Accreditation decisions for all agencies are too often based on elements of institutional form—Ph.D. ratios, book counts, curricular requirements, admission test scores, and others. These criteria are increasingly being challenged as unimportant or meaningless—little related to the fundamental values which the college is trying to achieve; yet, they commonly are the only bases available for judgment (Larson 1974: 3).

This author goes on to suggest that substantive elements of a program, being much more difficult to assess in any objective sense, are usually only examined closely by outside evaluators when questions of form have not been satisfactorily resolved. Large institutions, therefore, with large libraries and well-qualified faculty, satisfy formal requirements fairly easily and the substance of their programs is not always the object of intensive scrutiny. Small or nontraditional institutions frequently are in quite a different position and questions of substance emerge only after their difficulties in meeting formal standards have been demonstrated (Larson 1974).

Evaluation of Higher Education

The whole question of what evaluation criteria should be used to assess programs and institutions, and how quantifiable the results of applying these criteria should be, continues to attract considerable attention in the current literature. At this stage in the development of American higher education, there is general acceptance of the fact that institutional and program evaluation is here to stay. There is, however, considerable debate as to the form such evaluation should take.

The objections to strictly quantitative evaluation techniques are many. Bernstein, for example, notes the bias implicit in many evaluative techniques and decries the essentially political contexts within which these techniques are applied:

Evaluation theorists aren't comfortable with the idea that evaluation is not a science and that it cannot really be designed according to laboratory specifications. The results have immediate political overtones and the conclusions have consequences.

Evaluation is usually applied to a jerry-built program with ill-defined goals and with leaders who have been fighting to establish the legitimacy of their project. They have not had the luxury to sit down with an evaluator before or during their project.

Unfortunately, evaluation is increasingly being used as a weapon to kill educational programs rather than as a tool to improve them. It is little wonder, then, that one of the most pressing concerns about evaluation has to do with the question of honesty. How honest can a project person be with an evaluator when it is the evaluator's purpose to give the agency a "heat shield" with which to cover itself when funding is discontinued? A few notable evaluators have broken with past practice, acknowledging the subjectivity of their efforts. They are the revisionists. Unlike most of their colleagues, they are unable to establish a spirit of candor and trust with program staff (Bernstein 1977: 8).

Another commentary suggests that the crux of the problem lies, not in evaluation techniques themselves, but in the frequently highly emotional contexts within which they have been used. As a step toward some level of acceptance of these techniques by the academic community at large, it is suggested that greater care be taken in presenting the results of quantitative evaluations of academic programs for what they are—usually an assessment of a particular aspect of the educational process—and not as assessments of the process in its entirety (Kunz 1978). Cranton and Legge (1978) discuss the many difficulties of program evaluation in higher education and suggest that many of these from an inadequate appreciation of the fact that few evaluations can be carried out under strictly experimental conditions, but must be carefully planned and tailored to meet local situations and objectives. The thrust of Harris's (1978) discussion is to point to the many changes taking place in the admissions policies, structure, and objectives of American colleges to suggest that new criteria for assessment of them must be devised.

The excellent essay by Paul L. Dressel (1961) on the inevitability of evaluation in higher education represents an important attempt to consider the concept in an apolitical context. In making the point that evaluation is, when properly applied, a desirable process for an academic institution, he observes:

Evaluation is both a means and an end. As a means it includes studies and procedures designed to maintain and improve the quality of instruction or of learning. Tests, grades, student opinionnaires for appraising teaching, and intricately planned research studies—all are or may be means to assess and possibly to raise the quality of teaching. . . . Evaluation is also an end or a goal. Improved thought—be it critical, reflective, creative, or productive is undoubtedly the most frequently expressed single objective for higher education. Evaluation, in a word, comprehends all of these variations (Dressel 1961: 24-25).

Professional Education

A number of recent discussions of the state of professional education empha-

size the point that many unresolved difficulties in this area result from the peculiar nature of the obligation professional schools have undertaken. In one popular view, schools of this kind are distinctive in that they collectively have taken on the responsibility both for attracting an adequate supply of potential practitioners to their ranks and of ensuring that their graduates achieve a standard of professional competence satisfactory to the public. In market terms, professional schools have a monopoly on the education of new practitioners and, in return for this, are obliged to produce a supply of graduates who satisfy public needs in terms of both quality and quantity.

McGlothlin (1964), for example, discusses the future growth in the bodies of knowledge required of all professions, together with a vast increase in public demand for professional services, to suggest that radical changes in the education of professionals must occur if consumer needs are to be met. The assumption in this account is that educational institutions will be flexible enough to make the necessary changes in their academic programs. Others stress that the difficulties of expanding the supply of competent professionals in almost any field is fraught with the problems of quality control (Anderson 1962).

These problems are further compounded by the difficulties inherent in any attempt to implement a set of standards that not only protect the academic quality of an educational program, but also have some demonstrable influence on the job performance of its graduates. However, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that the quantitative effects of professional education, or of education of any kind, are extremely difficult to ascertain. Two major sources provide ample illustration of this point. Berg's (1970) extensive examination of the relationship between job performance and educational level in a wide variety of occupational groups found the connection between the two to be very weak. An ambitious review of studies attempting to establish the strength of the influence of success in college and in later life reached a very similar conclusion (Hoyt 1965). If results of this kind continue to find confirmation in the literature, then the future of professional education lies in deep water indeed.

At the same time that professional schools and accrediting agencies are grappling with these problems, they must also attempt to resolve those having a more immediate effect on the planning of curricula. For example, the relative commitment of a professional school to imparting theory or skill has yet to be resolved in many fields. Mayhew and Ford (1974) point to the dilemma of a school expected to produce graduates who have the broad theoretical backgrounds and research skills that will eventually qualify them for senior posts, but who can, at the same time, take over full professional responsibilities almost immediately after finishing their education. The problem faced here is of course that schools are obliged to balance their academic responsibilities against the expectations of the profession they serve. Moreover, as the professional school is located within a traditional academic structure, the question of which objectives the curriculum should attempt to fulfill is further complicated by the problem of what place the liberal arts and the social sciences in general should occupy in the student's learning experience.

The problem of the accreditation of professional schools, therefore, in-

volves all the difficulties of institutional accreditation, plus a few more. The questions of curricula content and the kind of education the public and the professions expect from these schools must be posed within the context of professional schools as integrated parts of larger academic institutions. The policies of these institutions will obviously exert an influence over the curricula of constituent schools and of the calibre and characteristics of those who study and those who teach in them.

As Mayhew and Ford point out, professional schools have reacted in very different, and sometimes conflicting ways, to similar problems. Nonetheless, these authors feel able to isolate a number of general trends in professional education:

It seems clear that professional education is drawing closer to the rest of the university to gain strength from relevant disciplines. Hospital schools of nursing are disappearing and nursing educators want virtually all nursing education to be within higher education. Almost all reports on professional education reject the separate trade school concept and indicate that only in a university setting can the requisite interdisciplinary and interdepartmental work be carried on. Professional faculties increasingly resemble professors rather than practitioners, with the role of clinical professor becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. This means that for the most part professional curricula emphasize basic science and theory rather than applied work in the belief that training in technique is training for obsolescence. Such a posture implies that professional schools are less concerned with developing high competence for a graduate's first job than with providing a base upon which a full but challenging career may be built. Time alone will determine whether this is a tenable decision (1974: 27-28).

Another perspective on the future development of professional education and accreditation suggests that professional training, and the agencies that accredit it, goes through a number of stages in its life cycle. The early stages are characterized by accrediting techniques intended to maintain basic standards and to weed out inferior schools. It is suggested that when most of the schools in a given field have attained these minimum standards, the role of the accrediting agency changes and the agency: "... begins a natural drift from its original restrictive and demanding position of 'applying standards' to the now more natural one of 'stimulating' those which have already met standards but need to be reminded periodically not to let down or go to seed" (Larson 1974: 6).

From this discussion, it appears likely that, if the entrenched professions experience problems in defining and evaluating the forms of education that best meet their needs, the newer professions, whose parameters are usually not so strictly demarcated, will experience even more difficulties in this area. There are many examples to indicate that this is indeed the case. The current situation in the allied health professions, for example, is one in which two separate accrediting agencies, both recognized by COPA, exist with overlapping jurisdictions. Consequences of this have been to increase the burdens, financial and otherwise, on schools, and to sour a number of educators and administrators in the field to the very notion of accreditation (Coughlin 1978).

The questions of when an occupational group should feel itself qualified to claim status as a profession, when—and if—it should seek professional accreditation, and who should control educational standards are very difficult to answer. Problems existing in these areas are, as has been indicated in this chapter, complex and no general answers to them have yet been provided.

There are many models of professional education and accreditation. To assist in clarifying some of the issues likely to be made as the fields of criminal justice and criminology seek to affirm their professional status, two models of professional education are described in Chapter II. It must be emphasized, however, that these models are presented here for purposes of illustration. They are not suggested as alternative models for the further development of criminal justice higher education.

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Chapter II

Two Models of Professionalization and Specialized Accreditation: Law and Public Administration

Overviews of the accreditation processes in the professions document the fact that the agencies that regulate accreditation in the different professional fields can vary considerably in structure. However, they can generally be classified into three broad types. The first type includes those agencies that are associations of members of the profession and is characteristic of the more established professional fields. The second includes those representing associations of schools or colleges that prepare students for careers in a given field. The third type is rather broader in its representation and agencies that fall within it usually include representatives from the appropriate associations of practitioners and schools, as well as from public agencies involved in the licensing or certification of professionals in that field; professions in this third category include dentistry, architecture, and pharmacy (Blauch 1959: 5-6).

In addition, it is apparent that different professions are at different stages in their evolution. Some professions are well entrenched, and although debate over what program of training is most suitable for them continues, guidelines concerning the process of accreditation and evaluation have long since been established. In these fields, the question of the kind of agency that should oversee these processes generally was answered long ago. Other professions, or occupations aspiring to professional status, are in a quite different situation and are still grappling with all the problems inherent in the attempt to specify precise objectives and criteria for evaluating educational programs. The move toward professionalization is a well-documented trend in America today and is indicated by the increasing number of concerned organizations applying to the Council on Postsecondary Education for recognition as accrediting agencies in their particular fields (Herrell 1974).

This chapter provides a brief overview of the experiences of two occupational groups with the process of professionalization and the attendant problems of education and training. Each of these groups, public administration and law, falls within one of the two categories outlined above. It should be noted that neither of them is discussed here with the recommendation that it

necessarily be used as a model for future developments in the professionalization of the criminal justice field. Some analysis of them is given to indicate a few of the kinds of problems the criminal justice field is likely to encounter in its further development. Examination of the experiences of other groups, including, but not limited to, the two mentioned here, may help professional education in criminal justice avoid unproductive lines of approach.

The Law

The development of a formalized process of legal education occurred at a very early stage in post-Revolutionary history. In colonial days, training for the legal profession was loosely controlled and individuals could prepare for admission to the bar either on their own, through self-directed programs of reading, by a form of apprenticeship in a court or in the office of a working lawyer, or through formal study at one of the Inns of Court in London. During this period, academic institutions concerned themselves very little with legal education. However, during the last two decades of the eighteenth century, a number of law schools were established and, in the decades that followed, these became increasingly important in the training of lawyers (O'Hara 1969).

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the profession itself made little attempt to devise or regulate minimum standards of training for those in it. Most of the standards implemented at this time chiefly concerned the length and nature of the required period of apprenticeship and were introduced as requirements for admission to the bar by legislation or by court rules (Warren 1911). The founding of the American Bar Association in 1878 saw the beginning of a period in which control of most substantial aspects of the legal profession passed into the hands of the practitioners, a period that has continued up to, and including, the present day.

From the beginning, the ABA was concerned, in principle if not in practice, with "unifying the legal profession and of strengthening and standardizing the preparation for and admission into this profession" (Parsons 1975: 138). Discussions on the nature and quality of legal training occupied a prominent place in the early meetings of the association. The principle that such training be carried out in law schools, rather than through the old system of apprenticeship, was established in a committee report presented to the association at its annual meeting in 1880. Some resistance to this principle was encountered, primarily, it has been suggested, because of the apparent conflict between it and the democratic ideal, which was then commonly interpreted to mean that restrictions on admission to the bar constituted restrictions on the rights of citizens (Sullivan 1952).

This idea gradually became eroded over the next few years and the association came to stress its preference for law school training of an acceptable standard in stronger and stronger terms (Parsons 1975). The principles that law school training should be mandatory for admission to the bar, and that this training should extend over a period of three years, were established in 1897, and the further principle (which is applied to this day), that training at proprietary schools should not be considered as fulfilling this requirement, was adopted the following year (Hervey 1959).

The function of the ABA as an accrediting body was established in 1921, when the association passed a resolution instituting minimum standards for law schools and stating its own intention to publish lists of institutions that, after due inspection, were found to meet these standards. This development was probably a logical culmination of many years of discussion over the quality of legal training (Hervey 1959). It was, however, given considerable impetus by the publication of an extensive report on the nature and quality of legal education throughout the United States, carried out under the sponsorship of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which was quite critical of many aspects of the system then in existence (Reed 1920). Although the ABA was not granted formal status as an accrediting agency until 1952, its function as a *de facto* body of accreditation was therefore established several decades before this.

In 1931 the National Conference of Bar Examiners was founded as an organization quite specifically concerned with requirements for bar admission and with procedures for admission to practice. This organization, as an association of professionals, has always worked very closely with the American Bar Association's Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar and was, in fact, founded by individuals closely involved with the activities of the section. The major functions of the conference are largely to encourage the further integration of professional standards, and it has been suggested that the importance of its contributions "in reviewing and appraising bar examination procedures, in developing character fitness standards, and in establishing principles of reciprocity between various State and local bar associations cannot be overstated" (Parsons 1975: 143).

The American Association of Law Schools was originally established as a subsidiary of the ABA and was instituted in 1899 as a mechanism for developing close working relationships between the law schools themselves and between them and the ABA. Although the two organizations continue to cooperate closely on most common issues, they separated structurally in 1914, ostensibly because of mechanical problems in scheduling joint meetings that could be attended by both practitioners and educators. However, it is suggested that the net result of this schism was to provide the AALS with greater freedom and also to widen "an already existing gulf between law teachers and the members of the practicing bar" (Harno 1953: 100).

The history of the development of legal education in the United States documents a progressive growth in the influence of the profession. As one standard work on the subject indicates:

A perspective on legal education discloses that while its progress is affected by many agencies, those to the actions of which it is most sensitive are the profession itself and the instrumentalities for bar admission. They are all, indeed, parts of a common machinery. . . . [However, it] was not until the bar became organized and its leaders were able to express the views of the organized bar that the profession as such became a dynamic and guiding force (Harno 1953: 71).

Standards for legal education and membership in the profession continue to be carefully regulated by three organizations acting in concert: the American Bar Association's Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar,

the Association of American Law Schools, and the National Conference of Bar Examiners. In practice, the functions of the three are well coordinated with one another and although overlap of jurisdiction does occur, each organization can be thought of as specializing in one particular aspect of admission to the profession. The National Conference is chiefly involved in procedures and requirements of admission to practice. In this capacity, the functions of the conference are largely "in reviewing and appraising bar examination procedures in developing character fitness standards, and in establishing principles of reciprocity between various State and local bar associations" (Parsons 1975: 143). Although, as noted earlier, the AALS functions as an accreditation agency in applying quite strict standards to its present and potential members, this organization generally cannot be said to exercise a significant level of control over entrance to the profession. While some states require candidates for admission to the bar to be graduates of schools that are members of the AALS, most do not. It is approval of a school by the ABA that in most states qualifies its graduates to apply for professional status (Strong 1959).

In law, it is the highest court in each state that has the power to define qualifications for bar admission. In practice, the power of determining what is a satisfactory educational qualification for this is most commonly delegated to the ABA (ABA 1976; "ABA Approval of Law Schools" 1974). The process of accreditation in the legal profession is therefore an uncommonly important one and the ABA has traditionally devoted an appropriate amount of attention to the process itself and the standards applied in it. It should be noted, however, that while the implementation of minimum educational standards in law is general, it is not yet total. As one author observes: "[B]oth unapproved law schools and substandard requirements for the admission to the bar in certain localities continue to exist. If there is one major flaw in the accreditation system of the United States, this is it: no central regulating body exists that can mandate uniform standards under which practitioners and training institutions may be certified. After almost 100 years, the legal profession is still jousting with this problem" (Parsons 1975: 145). It seems important to comment here that, if such a problem still exists in a profession as well established as law, the likelihood that any emerging profession will be able to impose universal controls over the qualifications of its members appears to be remote.

The standards determining accreditation and the procedural rules governing the ways in which they are applied are elaborate and are subject to constant examination (ABA 1976). Nonetheless, they are frequently the object of quite specific criticisms. Most of these center on two separate but closely related issues: what the objectives of legal education should be and whether it is appropriate for professional standards to be controlled directly by an organization of practitioners. Debates over these questions are complex and ongoing and the volume of publications dealing with them enormous.

Two works have had a considerable impact on these debates: the Carrington Report, commissioned by the American Association of Law Schools (AALS 1971), and the report sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (Packer and Ehrlich 1972). Although the reports differ

widely in many recommendations (the Carrington Report is probably the more conservative), they concurred in several major observations about the nature of American legal education. Central among these was the suggestion, echoed many times in the literature before and since, that the residence requirements for the J.D. be reduced from three to two years and that postgraduate training of a practical bent be mandated for admission to the bar. The rationale for this proposal is similar in both reports: Each rejects the notion of the "omnicompetent" lawyer and recognizes that law schools should attempt to develop a greater diversification of skills in their graduates. At the same time, it is accepted that the practice of law requires the acquisition of increasing levels of expertise. The recommendation that the length of formal schooling be reduced should in no way be interpreted as reflecting a view that a *lower* level of scholarly and professional attainment is indicated. On the contrary, both reports view legal education as a life-long process. Reduction in the length of formal training is viewed as a way of restructuring legal education to lessen the emphasis on the traditional case-study approach to the law, pioneered by Langdell at Harvard Law School in the late nineteenth century, and closely followed as a model of law school education ever since. Packer and Ehrlich, for example, suggest that this method of instruction has long since been outdated. Their opinions on the desirable length of the law school curriculum appear to be in a large part influenced by their wish to see a radical reassessment of the curriculum:

Now that no attempt is actually made to teach the students very much of the doctrine of the subjects they study, they are taught over and over again in the variously named classes the same method to use in hacking "through the underbrush." They have usually learned the method after one or, at most, two years. Although never fully justified, and less so now than before, the three-year requirement . . . is entrenched in contemporary legal education. . . . In all events, we would expect the availability of the two-year option to trigger in most law schools a major review of their curriculum. This in itself is a strong argument for the option (1972: 79-83).

It will be seen that there are several sets of forces moving, sometimes in apparent conflict with one another, toward change in legal education. There is widespread feeling that education in this field does not provide adequate preparation for the practice of law in many specific areas. The many empirical studies that document this (reviewed and summarized in Baird 1978) indicate a general view on the part of practicing attorneys that their formal study constitutes inadequate preparation for legal skills of a practical nature.

On the other hand, there is also substantial opinion that the tremendous growth over the last few decades in the body of the law as an object of study places an increased premium on the law schools' obligations to maintain the intellectual strengths of a legal education. It is also often suggested that greater levels of specialization be encouraged in the educational process as the only way of enabling law schools to produce graduates who are equipped, even in a minimal sense, to begin to tackle the intricacies of practice in their chosen fields (Rohan 1976).

Superimposed on this debate over the direction law schools should take are

many demands that the educational process accept greater commitment to fostering humanistic and intellectual values. There are those who would suggest that the teaching of law in the university should be geared more toward the intellectual development of students and less toward preparation for admission to the bar (Velvel 1978). However, a more controversial area of concern is the advocating of a change in the focus of law school curricula to encourage the development of professional and moral values that are socially appropriate. There are two related aspects to these discussions. Auerbach (1976), among others, objects to what he regards as the failure of practicing attorneys to exercise moral values in deciding which clients and which issues to represent. Related to this is the concern that: "America's 400,000 lawyers, having received their professional training without ever being encouraged to analyze social policy according to ethical principles, tend to pursue a policy of value neutrality in their private lives, where considerations of client loyalty should not operate. The effect of this tendency among lawyers, who are disproportionately represented in positions of policy-making in society, is to impede the pace of social change" (Hellman 1978: 182-83). Although one could quarrel with a view that places responsibility for post-Watergate public dissatisfaction with the legal profession directly at the door of the law schools, the statements of Hellman and others should be taken as one further indication of the many criticisms of legal education emanating from inside and outside the profession.

There is no doubt that many of the recommendations for change in legal education are in opposition to one another. One school of thought, associated with practitioners, calls for training more directly relevant to the immediate demands placed on the novice lawyer. Another stresses legal education as a source of intellectual and moral inspiration and views law schools as logical institutions for the investigation of a broad range of social issues. Both advocate quite different changes in the structure of legal education, but with the same expressed aim of producing graduates who are better equipped to serve their clients.

Most of the debate concerning these issues occurs, not surprisingly, in the context of curricular change. Most of the proposals and counterarguments centering on curricular reform are now fairly standard (McKay 1977). One consequence of the many discussions suggesting that law school students be exposed to a broader educational experience has been the introduction of non-law courses into the curriculum and in the creation of combined degree courses. Both these movements have gained a limited amount of ground, although it has been pointed out that both have primarily involved the study of law in combination with one or other of the social or policy sciences. Very few efforts have been made to encourage the introduction of the humanities into the law school curriculum (McKay 1977).

An innovation that has made a good deal of headway is the introduction of clinical training programs, which now exist in most law schools in the country (Council on Legal Education 1977). The arguments supporting the extensive use of this kind of training are many and have been summarized and discussed extensively in the literature (see, for example, Pincus 1976). The relative speed with which clinical courses have come to be almost a standard

feature of the law school curriculum has largely been determined by the many and various influences that have exerted pressure to persuade the schools to move in this direction. Pressures within law schools themselves have opened the doors to the inclusion of more practical work within the curriculum. The courts themselves have become increasingly concerned over the poor advocacy and other courtroom skills demonstrated by beginning lawyers, and Chief Justice Warren Burger is but the most prestigious of a number of judges who have campaigned for law school reform in this area (see, for example, Burger 1973, Roark 1978).

However, the influence of the profession has probably had the greatest influence in bringing about curricular changes of this kind. This influence has been expressed in a number of ways, most obviously in debate in the literature, and, perhaps more effectively, in a number of recent actions taken by organizations over which the professions have direct control. In its 1977 revision of its standards of accreditation, the ABA included a requirement that law schools accept some obligation to develop standards of professional responsibility (ABA 1977). This has been interpreted to mean that attention paid to the teaching techniques applied, and the skills developed, will be increased (McKay 1977). Perhaps more to the point, although of less long-term significance, is the recent decision of at least one state bar association to exercise direct control over legal education in that state by requiring that candidates for the bar have taken specified courses of study (Beytagh 1974).

In spite of all these pressures and influences, law school curricula remain, in general, uniform, and adhere closely, now as in the past, to standards set by a few academic institutions. A recent survey of programs, sponsored by the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility, concluded that:

[T]he required segments of law school curricula are, on the average, much alike (particularly in the first year); that changes across time (though modest) generally have been in the direction of reducing the number of required courses; and that the control and size of required curricular segments tend to follow the lead of prestigious schools, most notably Harvard (Jackson and Gee 1976: 1).

However, there are particular reasons why the profession may become more closely involved with legal education. Present discussions about the feasibility of a national bar examination and extensions of the existing multi-state bar examinations (Covington 1976) serve to draw attention to present criteria for legal education and admission to the bar. The profession's further interest in these matters is likely to be stimulated by present attempts to determine the precise nature of the relationship between form and content of legal education and lawyer competence, and by recent proposals to improve the quality of advocacy in federal courts by introducing stricter educational requirements for those applying for admission to the federal bar (McKay 1977; Sovern 1976).

This last development has exacerbated the tension, apparently endemic to the field of law, between practitioner and educator (Allen 1976). Not surprisingly, opposition to such a move has come primarily from the law schools or those associated with them (McKay 1977).

A further area of potential conflict, which involves the federal government as well as the ABA and the AALS, has emerged recently. Although the ABA has traditionally not encountered federal opposition to its policies of accreditation, its refusal to consider accreditation of proprietary, or profit-making, schools has lately been challenged by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Under pressure from the department, the ABA has instituted a committee to review its traditional policy in this regard and this committee is currently attempting to ascertain the possible consequences of revoking this policy. It has, however, been suggested that: "There is the possibility of a sharp difference of opinion with HEW and more than a remote chance of litigation by proprietary schools if approval continues to be denied" (McKay 1977: 569).

In a somewhat related problem area, both the ABA and the AALS have for some time been increasingly unhappy with the financial costs of carrying out the inspections and reinspections required by the accreditation process. The ABA's suggestion that these costs be underwritten, at least in part, by levying the member schools has not been received in an altogether sanguine fashion by the AALS (AALS 1976: 1).

The discussion given so far in this chapter suggests that, in spite of the existence of the American Bar Association as the vehicle for control of all aspects of professional activity by the practitioner, the exercise of this control over the educational process has not been without its difficulties. Up until now, law schools have proven resistant to the kinds of changes desired by the profession and the courts. Such changes are, as has been shown, beginning to occur, but law schools continue to demonstrate an innate conservatism. It has, however, been suggested in this review that the schools are possibly on the verge of making quite substantial concessions toward meeting the needs of the profession and its clients.

Public Administration

This field and its close relatives, the policy sciences, are presently in a crucial stage in their development, both in terms of their development as applied social sciences and as objects of study within an academic setting. All are currently wrestling with the problems of gaining recognition for the unique nature of their disciplines. As a parallel, and of course related, development, public administrators in particular are seeking acceptance as full professionals, or at least as possessors of an occupational status that is definable and prestigious.

Comparisons of the situations of public administration and criminal justice in these respects reveal unsurprising similarities. For this reason, the development of the field of public administration is discussed here to provide a possible indication of the problems the criminal justice area is likely to encounter and, perhaps, some suggestions as to how these might be resolved or avoided. This kind of comparison is likely to be particularly valuable because of the relative stages in their life histories attained by the two disciplines. Public administration has, as will be shown, advanced a little further along the road toward professionalization than has criminal justice. More concerted

efforts have been made toward coordinating academic programs and establishing guidelines that may at some future time provide a basis for standards of accreditation. Because of this alone, one would suggest that any serious attempt to investigate the possibility of accreditation in the area of criminal justice, or how guidelines for such accreditation should be developed, should pay some attention to the difficulties currently being encountered in the emergence of public administration as an academic discipline.

The historical development of public administration as a body of integrated theory and as a subject for study within the university has been well covered in the literature (see for example, Caldwell 1965; Golembiewski 1974, 1977; Henry 1975). Most of these present the field as having gone through four or five major stages, each of which has had a considerable influence on the form and structure of the subject as organized within an academic setting.

Henry describes this development by applying five historical "paradigms," defined here to reflect the changing characteristics of the discipline's self-identity and the processes through changes in this identity occurred. In presenting his five paradigms, Henry follows Golembiewski's practice of analyzing each face in terms of two separate dimensions:

Locus is the institutional "where" of the field. A recurring locus of public administration is the government bureaucracy, but this has not always been the case and often this traditional locus has been blurred. *Focus* is the specialized "what" of the field. One focus of public administration has been the study of certain "principles of administration," but, again, the foci of the discipline have altered with the changing paradigms of public administration. . . . [These] paradigms . . . may be understood in terms of locus or focus; when one has been relatively sharply defined, the other has been relatively ignored in academic circles and vice versa (1975: 378).

The emphasis in the first stage, described as coinciding with the first quarter of this century, is considered to have been on the mechanical functions of the executive branch of government. Because of this emphasis, the paradox was created in which public administration became firmly rooted, as an academic discipline, with political science, but was at the same time quite distinct from it. As the study of the processes of government, political science came to hold a monopoly of all theoretical concerns. Public administration came to be regarded as the study of how policies dictated from above were implemented, in the most efficient way, by a neutral bureaucracy.

In the second phase (1927-1950), the focus of the field broadened as those in it sought to erect a theoretical structure unique to the field and to apply it within both public and private institutions. Theory and principles were therefore emphasized without regard to the nature of the organizations (loci) in which they could be applied. From about 1938 on, the nature and validity of these principles began to be questioned and, at the same time, the conceptual value of maintaining the traditional separation between theories of politics and administration began also to be called into doubt. In the last ten years or so of the existence of this paradigm, a number of writers began to advocate the view that the basis for theory-building in the field should be broadened to include a heavier reliance on the findings of the behavioral sciences in an

attempt to create a science in which the emphasis was more on its theoretical purity than on its application.

Despite the direction of these influences, the overlapping third and fourth phases discussed by Henry reflected the return of public administration to its former associations with political science and administrative science. The motivation behind the first of these two alliances is described as resulting from influence within both political science and public administration. Of those that affected the latter discipline, the two singled out are the dissatisfaction of those in the field with alternative models of development and the sense of security the association afforded. It is considered that public administration's share in the relationship lay in its role in: "... the formulation of public policies within public bureaucracies and their delivery to the polity. Political science was perceived as considering the 'inputs and outputs' of the process: the pressures in the polity generating political and social change. Hence, there was a carrot as well as a stick inducing public administrations to stay within the homey confines of the mother discipline" (Henry 1975: 381).

As a consequence of this development, the teaching of public administration began to return to the control of departments of political science and it is suggested that the consequences were, at least for the former subject, unfortunate and public administration, "as an identifiable field of study, began a long, downhill spiral" (1975: 381). In a trend that paralleled this, which was also to some extent a consequence of it, a number of scholars and schools in public administration turned to administrative science as a model. In this phase, the emphasis moved away from agencies in the public sector as unique objects for study and toward closer involvement in the more general field of organization theory. Many writers display a certain ambivalence toward this development. On the one hand, this field recognizes the very real similarities between large organizations, whether profit-making or not. On the other, such an approach tends to obscure those problems peculiar to organizations in the public sector. In criticizing the administrative science approach to public administration, Henry observes that this approach:

... cannot comprehend the supravalue of the public interest. Without a sense of the public interest, administrative science can be used for *any* purpose, no matter how antithetical to democratic values that purpose may be. The concept of determining and implementing the public interest constitutes a defining pillar of public administration and a locus of the field that receives little if any attention within the context of administrative science, just as the focus of organization theory management/science garners scant support in political science (1975: 383).

The model constructed by Henry for the historical development of public administration is very similar to those presented by other writers (Golembiewski 1974, 1977; Holzer 1976; Waldo 1975). Most writers, including Henry, emphasize the unreality of attempting to define these historical phases too precisely in time. Holzer, for example, notes that:

The history of insights into public administration is often neatly divided into discrete periods. ... But that neatness can be unnecessarily arbitrary, seeming

to confine any one emphasis to certain years. Hard and fast divisions are also misleading if students then presume that each successive school displaced its predecessor as the "correct" emphasis. Public administration might more clearly be described as a series of continuing and overlapping insights, *none* of which have been completely supplanted (1976: i-iii).

Analyses of current and future directions in public administration recognize, in line with the statement quoted above, the continuing importance of past approaches to the discipline. They also provide considerable discussion of a number of quite recent developments that are presently exerting a considerable influence on the theoretical development of the field, on the way in which it is practiced, and on the form and content of teaching programs in it.

Current trends in the field (i.e., those thought to have had a significant impact from about 1970 on) appear to be almost universally discussed in terms of the growing popularity of the "public policy approach," which has now come to be a major, if not a dominant, influence on how public administration is viewed and taught in academic institutions. It is indicative of the presently fluid state of public administration that there is no universally accepted definition of what the policy approach should encompass or how much it should be emphasized within programs of academic study. Golembiewski, for example, discusses four separate varieties of this approach (1977, I: 77-115). Each of these is discussed as concentrating on a different aspect of the form and the content of public policy formation and implementation. However, the common characteristic of all is their acceptance of the tenet that attempts to separate the processes of formulating and implementing policy in public agencies are ultimately barren. Thus, as Lazarsfeld points out in his overview of the policy science movement (1975), the researcher taking such an approach is obliged to assess the possible applications of his research effort, as well as his findings. Analysis of the problem at hand and possible solutions to it are investigated in one and the same operation.

The research methodology of social scientists adopting this kind of approach is necessarily interdisciplinary. As a consequence, the teaching of this approach in universities has necessitated a diffusion of subject matter, which has prevented the field of public administration from maintaining its monopoly over policy studies as a scholarly endeavor. There is now a very considerable body of literature dealing with the growth of the policy studies movement and the problems currently encountered in developing graduate programs and designing curricula appropriate to it. Much of this literature addresses the question of what the relationship between policy studies and public administration should be, within an academic setting (see, for example, Crecine 1971; Engelbert 1977; Yates 1977). It appears to be generally thought that the academic future of the policy sciences does not lie within the confines of the traditional organizational structure of colleges and universities. The question of how far academic structure should be modified to meet this need is as yet unresolved. As Lepawsky has pointed out, the question conceals a dilemma which is not easily resolved in a conceptual sense:

Public Administration has remained too narrow when treated sheerly as an implemental discipline. The possibility of embracing the socio-political sciences

and their diverse subdisciplines within a superdiscipline known as Policy Science is the most inclusive of all the current approaches. Nevertheless, here too the danger of an overstructured rationality of a metascience, that is of undue diversion upon the method (as both technique and strategy) of how to make policies (rather than a more contentful concern for what policies are made and why) will have to be studiously avoided if we want to stop cumulating our sophistication and curtailing our substance (1970: 447).

A discussion of the above developments has been necessary to explain the wide variety in organizational form and in theoretical orientation that currently exists among public administration programs in higher education. The existence of these variations has served to inhibit the development of a sense of common purpose within the field and the ease with which standardized guidelines for evaluating academic programs could be developed and applied. Consequentially, the path of the field toward professionalization and accreditation has been tortuous and sometimes rocky. The historical, and continuing, influence of different theoretical approaches to public administration and the recent impact of the policy studies movement have combined to create a diversity of educational programs in this area much greater than that usually associated with a profession, or even with specialized accreditation.

In the light of this and earlier discussion, it is not surprising that the early history of education for public administration closely parallels theoretical developments in the field and variations in perceptions of the needs educational programs should be designed to meet. However, it is clear that the demonstration of interest on the part of universities and governmental agencies in developing appropriate programs for educating and training public managers is far from being a recent phenomenon. University involvement in education for public management began on a large scale in the 1920s, although such education was focused upon theoretical concerns, rather than on education for the practitioner (White 1933). This perspective was maintained in the years that followed with the result that, as one history of education for public administration in this period notes: "... only a handful of university programs organized before 1933 became genuinely professional and multidisciplinary and achieved an enduring institutional status" (Stone and Stone 1975: 27).

As earlier discussion of the stages in the theoretical development of public administration suggests, the concept of the subject as a professional field of study is a fairly recent development. Current debate on education and training of public administrators, and on the related questions of professionalization and accreditation, is largely carried out within the context of issues raised in the findings of a series of reports published between 1967 and the present.

The first of these, the so-called Honey Report (Honey 1967), was the result of a study commissioned by the Council on Graduate Education for Public Administration (CGEPA) with the dual objective of identifying current educational practices in the field and of clarifying problematic areas that should be the objects of later and more intensive study. Honey's conclusions were controversial and provoking—especially because they addressed the very broad question of how higher education in general could best meet the needs of

American society, as these were perceived at a time at which a very optimistic view of social progress appeared to be justified. Considerable attention was, however, paid in this report to the wide variety of organizational patterns found to exist in departments and schools of public administration, and to the diversity of theoretical emphases in educational programs given in them. A few common elements of a core curriculum were identified. However, these represented subjects that focused heavily on the application of administrative concepts, rather than on theoretical concerns. Closely related to this finding was the observation that the organizational units responsible for teaching and research within universities were not generally found to be influential within their parent institutions.

Honey produced a number of recommendations for the refinement of public administration as a uniform and systematized discipline. Most of these emphasized the importance of developing the relationships between teaching, research, and the application of research findings and theoretical concepts. This report was intended only as a preliminary survey of the field and no formal analysis of educational programs in the area was undertaken. The fact that many of the observations in it were presented in an impressionistic way was probably responsible for the many criticisms levelled at Honey's discussion (Heady 1967). Nonetheless, many of the comments made by Honey have been widely considered justified and trenchant. Some of his conclusions include perceptions about the nature of public administration as a profession that many would feel to be as valid now as they were a decade ago.

Those in the field are acutely aware of intellectual problems. Is public administration a field, a discipline, a science, a profession? Or is it the process of conducting public business, which requires the knowledge and skills of many disciplines and professions? Efforts to define it as a field or a discipline and so to establish it have been less than successful. Public administration is related to political science, economics, psychology, sociology, law, and other fields, and imaginative teaching in public administration tends always to demonstrate this. . . . As a profession it has a doubtful status. It does not impose a set of standards on practitioners. It does not require practical experience on the part of educators. It does not engage in certification (1967: 301).

Since the publication of the Honey Report, there have been a number of efforts to gather hard data on the nature of academic programs in public administration. Some of these appear to have been undertaken in direct response to the explicit suggestions for future research included in the Honey Report. Most of them, however, seem also to have been motivated by a desire to document movements within the field that support the position that public administration is making some progress toward professionalization. A number of these warrant particular attention—if only because the data included in published reports of them have a direct bearing on the current debate as to whether public administration has achieved a sufficient level of integration to qualify its educational programs for specialized accreditation.

One of the first of these was sponsored by the National Academy of Public Administration and carried out with the twofold purpose of ascertaining present developments in the field and of determining whether there existed any

consensus about what future directions higher education in public administration should take (Chapman and Cleaveland 1973). Particular criticisms of educational programs made in this report included vagueness of objectives, inadequate resources, lack of appropriate interdisciplinary courses, and neglect of continuing education and the recruitment of career administrators. A major finding of this study was, however, that a program's ability to meet professional needs depended in a large part on the institutional location of the program. Those located in autonomous professional schools of public administration, or in "generic schools," were found to display a greater commitment to skills (such as policy analysis and quantitative methods) deemed more in keeping with modern conceptions of professional education in the field. Programs situated within political science departments were found to be less professional when judged by this criterion.

Although the NAPA study has been subject to some criticism (see Howard 1975), its findings have achieved some confirmations from other quarters. Two later surveys undertaken under the auspices of the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) obtained quite similar findings. In these studies, carried out in 1974 and 1975, the location of a program was found to be the major determinant of course structure and content. As in the NAPA study, it was found that programs could be conveniently grouped on an organizational spectrum ranging from autonomous schools to programs offered within political science departments, with those clustered toward the former category being more likely to offer the kind of interdisciplinary courses most favored by supporters of the policy sciences approach. The 1974 study (Mackelprang and Fritschler 1975, NASPAA 1974a) did, however, note that considerable diversity existed within each grouping along the spectrum and that organizational form was therefore obviously no guarantee of a program's course offerings or general orientation. Positive findings of this survey are, moreover, expressed in a qualified fashion:

There is little evidence in these data supporting those who claim the field in general is interdisciplinary, broad in curricula offerings, or demanding in the analytic and quantitative skills required. Yet, there is every indication that significant movement toward these objectives is under way (Mackelprang and Fritschler 1975: 189).

The report of the 1975 survey (Fritschler and Mackelprang 1977) actually presents a comparative account of the findings of the 1974 and 1975 studies. One striking difference between the two surveys was the numbers of programs and schools discussed. The later account provides a measure of the rapid growth of public administration programs at the graduate level within a very short period. There were also indications that these programs were becoming more standardized:

In terms of content and focus of [public affairs/public administration] programs, there is substantially more consistency than was observed in 1973 [sic]. Programs in PA/A appear to be reaching a fair degree of consensus on the fundamental aspects of graduate education in PA/A (1977: 494).

On the face of it, public administration would appear to be well on its way toward achieving the kind of standardized educational objectives commonly associated with professionalization and specialized accreditation. NASPAA has taken a very special and ongoing interest in these developments. It surveys educational trends in the field with some regularity; the last such survey was carried out in 1977 and its findings are as yet unreported. In addition, it has established a series of guidelines and standards covering professional educational programs at the baccalaureate, master's, and doctoral levels and has also formed a task force on long-range goals, which has been specifically charged with investigating the possibilities of specialized accreditation (Engelbert 1977a: 526).

There are, however, many indications that, even within the field, a consensus that such a step is an appropriate one may be obtained with difficulty, if at all. In the first place it is apparent that, in spite of the optimism of the latest NASPAA survey, educational programs in the area continue to be diffuse in content, objectives, and organizational form. An examination of Fritschler and Mackelprang's own findings indicates that the trend toward consistency, which they suggest, is a relative phenomenon. In absolute terms, the spread of programs is still considerable. Moreover, in some areas, this spread has in fact increased. They note that: "There is considerable variation among programs in core course requirements. . . . The data show that there is little consistency in core course requirements, and several programs have no core requirements at all. It appears that there are fewer programs with core requirements, and fewer core course requirements in 1975 than there were in 1973" (1977: 491). In addition, there are many indications that the trend away from the location of subjects related to public administration in political science departments, a trend considered so desirable by public administrationists, may not be as strong as has been supposed. The recent survey carried out by Nagel and Neef reached the conclusion that "policy studies are alive and well in political science departments and interdisciplinary programs across the country, and still growing rapidly" (1977: 390).

Second, there is doubt as to whether a degree in the field would in itself ever constitute a basis for entry into the profession. There is some evidence that holders of master's degrees in public administration place a high value on the utility of the qualification (Grote and Holzer 1975). However, there are many studies indicating that the proportion of public sector administrators in possession of these degrees is, and is likely to remain, very small (Honey 1967; Schott 1976). Furthermore, there are many unresolved questions about the level of degree that should be viewed as an acceptable qualification. The questions of how undergraduate degrees should fit into the concept of professionalism remain largely unresolved, although it is apparent that the teaching of public administration at this level is growing apace (Coplin 1976; Paulsen 1974; Smith 1976).

These and other arguments have been used by Richard L. Schott (1976) to present a reasoned critique, at several levels, of the twin concepts of professionalization and specialized accreditation in the field. Using sociological definitions of professionalism, with their emphasis on internal codes of ethics and monopoly of the licensing of practitioners, Schott attempts to show that

the aspirations of public administration to this status are quite unrealistic. On the more specific question of accreditation, he suggests that the existence of substantial diversity among educational programs in the field serves to create opposition to accreditation, based on fears that such a step would lead to the imposition of standards of "stultifying conformity" (Schott 1976: 255).

There is evidence to suggest that such fears do indeed exist. A recent poll of educators and administrators employed in public administration programs documents the point that opposition to the institution of accreditation standards is substantial, in fact, almost overwhelming (Engelbert 1977a).

At this point it is clear that much of the progress that appears to have been made toward specialized accreditation in this area is of doubtful strength. The activities of NASPAA toward this end have encouraged a level of interest in accreditation that is impressive. This interest has, however, by no means created a climate within the field favorable to the notion of accreditation. Although the debate is by no means over (it may in fact have hardly begun), one can suggest that, as of the end of 1978, the level of opposition to specialized accreditation on the part of public administrationists is substantial and may prove insuperable.

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Chapter III

The Growth and Development of Criminology and Criminal Justice in Higher Education

Theoretical Development

Criminology, as an academic discipline and as a basis for the formulation of social policy, has traditionally suffered from a crisis of identity. In definitions of its subject matter and objectives, and in the theoretical approaches that have been taken to it, criminology has been variously interpreted at different times and in different places. The two schools of thought most influential in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which continue to flourish in varying forms in the intellectual perspectives of many societies, have been based on quite different assessments of the desired scope of the field. There are obvious philosophical differences between the two schools, represented by the so-called positivist and classical traditions and their many descendants. In its rawest form, the former can be characterized by its rejection of free will as a significant determinant of criminal behavior, its reliance on a variety of physical as well as structural causes of crime, and its espousal of strictly nonpunitive social responses to criminal activity. These characteristics are usually contrasted with those of the classical tradition, which, again in their most basic form, reflected a conception of criminal behavior that viewed individual crimes as the products of the exercise of acts of choice that were essentially rational and self serving.

The ongoing development of these and other schools is very well covered in the literature (see, for example, Fox 1976; Jeffery 1972; Radzinowicz 1961; Taylor *et al.* 1973). Many classifications of schools and trends, in current as well as historical approaches to criminology, have been formulated and these provide a seemingly infinite number of characterizations of the evolutionary development of the field. However, one common feature of most of these classifications is their documentation of the extent to which different approaches to the study and to the teaching of the subject have been associated with different cultural traditions. A fairly clear distinction can be made between the European approaches, which have to a large degree been multidisciplinary, and the North American model, which has traditionally viewed criminology as a field of specialization within the larger discipline of sociology.

The European focus has been associated with a variety of themes that have not always been in harmony with one another. A widely made criticism of the positivist school concerns its emphasis on nonlegal concepts of crime. It is often suggested that the attempts of this school to avoid relative concepts of criminal activity resulted in theoretical approaches that ignored the processes through which stated norms of behavior were developed and enforced (see, for example, Quinney 1969). There is little doubt that this characteristic has, at least until the very recent past, exerted a strong influence in the directions taken by European criminology and it accounts, at least in part, for the clinical strains evident in much of the thinking in this school. For example, Pinatel's overview (1977) of developments in European criminology during the last 25 years discusses the theoretical emphasis on the characteristics and treatment of the offender as the dominant focus during most of this period.

It is also true that the very diverse approaches taken by Europeans encouraged the early development of theoretical perspectives now considered by criminologists throughout the world to be of vital concern. Foremost among these is the approach, now generally considered to be of paramount importance, of addressing the structural context of crime. The relationships between the criminal and his milieu—and particularly between the individual and those institutions charged with enforcing, and therefore interpreting, the criminal code—now appear to be given pride of place by criminologists. Study of these relationships characterizes a large proportion of recent criminological research, in the United States and elsewhere. In fact, European criminology has always maintained at least some connection with the academic study of law. As Radzinowicz (1961) points out, in a comparative analysis of the study of criminology throughout the world, the subject is studied and taught routinely, if perhaps not effectively, in European law schools, while it is largely ignored in their American counterparts.

At the present time, much theoretical discussion within the field, both in the United States and elsewhere, centers on the tenets of what is called the "new criminology." Expositions of this approach present it as both a critique of existing sociological, as well as multidisciplinary, theories and as a revivification of perspectives which have traditionally been regarded as of seminal importance to social theory. Taylor and his associates (1973), for example, in what is probably the most carefully documented statement produced by this school, takes the form of a detailed critique of alternative theories, which is designed to make the point that crime and deviance can only be understood in the context of the overall social structure within which they exist.

American criminology has always been firmly grounded within the theoretical framework of sociology and has therefore been structurally able to recognize the inadequacy of attempting to formulate strictly behavioral definitions of crime:

Crime always involves both human behavior (acts) and the judgment or definitions (laws, customs, mores) of fellow human beings as to whether specific behavior is appropriate and permissible, or is improper and forbidden. Crime and criminality lie in the area of behavior that is considered improper and forbidden. There is, therefore, always a dual problem of explanation—that of

accounting for the behavior, *as behavior*, and equally important, accounting for the *definitions* by which specific behavior comes to be considered as crime or non-crime (Vold 1958: v-vi).

In this sense, the broad approach suggested by Taylor and others does not stand in such marked contrast to the central perspective of American criminology.

In calling for the greater integration of criminology and the study of social structure in general, the "new criminologists" in fact go beyond this, advocating the development of a larger theory of political economy. It is the ideological component their notion of such a theory includes that constitutes the quantum leap so many of their colleagues have found unacceptable. The commitment to social and institutional change that the "new criminologists" demand may be in keeping with the nineteenth century liberal notion of political economy, but it goes against recent traditions of sociological thought.

Moreover, as has been pointed out (Henslin 1975), for many years criminology sought to preserve a close connection with policy considerations. Definitions of the subject matter of criminology presented in textbooks sought to identify the field with specific types of social policy. The view of criminology as a body of theory concerned with the origins of crime was displaced by one that emphasized how theory could be applied for the prevention and control of crime (Quinney 1970).

The "new criminologists" do not reject the view that the findings of criminological theory should be used as a basis for social policy. What they do reject is the use of theory to develop policies that do not address the structural problems that are, in their opinion, the root cause of crime. The objection of this school is therefore not that criminological theory should not be applied, but that it has been applied in an insufficiently ambitious fashion:

It should be clear that a criminology which is not normatively committed to the abolition of inequalities of wealth and power, and in particular of inequalities in property and life-chances, is inevitably bound to fall into correctionalism. And all correctionalism is irreducibly bound up with the identification of deviance with pathology. A fully social theory of deviance must, by its nature, break entirely with correctionalism . . . precisely because . . . the causes of crime must be intimately bound up with the form assumed by the social arrangements of the time. Crime is ever and always that behaviour seen to be problematic within the framework of those social arrangements: for crime to be abolished, then, those social arrangements themselves must also be subject to fundamental social change (Taylor *et al.* 1973: 281-82).

The polemics of the "new criminologists" are not, of course, universally attractive. However, disenchantment with the application of traditional criminological thought in developing crime control policies has had a substantial effect on the level of optimism with which such policies are now formulated. The work of Ernest van den Haag (1975) probably represents the extreme wing of this disenchantment, as it includes a very pessimistic assessment of the concepts of crime prevention and offender rehabilitation. Van den Haag uses this assessment to develop a view of the proper objectives of

correctional policy that emphasizes the principle of retribution much more than that of rehabilitation.

James Q. Wilson (1975), discussing his experience while serving on federal crime commissions from the 1960s on, provides an interesting perspective on the relationship between criminological theory and public policy during this period. He concludes that:

[I]n the mid-1960s, and perhaps today as well, social scientists concerned with crime shared a common perspective, but not one that emphasized the material condition of society; that this shared perspective led to a policy stalemate and an ethical dilemma; that when social scientists were asked for advice by national policy-making bodies, they could not respond with suggestions derived from and supported by their scholarly work; and that as a consequence such advice as was supplied tended to derive from their general political views as modified by their political and organizational interaction with those policy groups and their staffs (1975: 44-45).

Wilson's argument is, in part, a subjective one and his assessment of how criminologists set about formulating the advice they offered to policy-making bodies is not substantiated. However, he does offer documentation for the more general point that at this time criminology was more concerned with investigating the origins of crime than with suggesting how more immediate problems could be alleviated. The traditional concern of the field for crime prevention and control (for which it has been criticized so much by the "new criminologists") is viewed by Wilson as representing more wish than fulfillment. His criticism is, therefore, that those in the field saw an obligation to develop an applied discipline, but their theoretical interests failed to reflect this.

There have been many similar attacks on criminology as an academic discipline. For instance, a recent editorial in the official journal of the American Society of Criminology (Jeffery 1977) presents a quite bitter indictment of the accomplishments of the field. It seems therefore that the discipline is under attack from two opposite poles: from the radicals, who protest the lack of emphasis on the overall social structure as creating criminogenic conditions, and from the conservatives, who denigrate the practical accomplishments that have been achieved.

A defense of the discipline can be made by reference to developments that have taken place over the last ten years. It can be maintained that these developments at the very least serve to lessen the bite of the many valid criticisms that have in the past been made of the field. In the first place, there has been, as noted earlier, a quite recent resurgence in commitment to an expanded definition of what the subject matter of criminology should be. Increased study of the sociology of law has, up to a point, reintegrated criminology into sociology, its parent discipline, as one of its main themes by focusing attention upon the nature of the rules by which criminal acts are defined. Although many would argue that there have, as yet, been relatively few attempts to analyze the processes by which law is created, rather than implemented, the number of respectable studies of the sociology of law is now substantial. A large proportion of these are historical and are discussed in

some detail by Inciardi, Block, and Hallowell (1977).

Second, there is some feeling now that the concept of rehabilitation, so much criticized in the last few years, has a good deal to recommend it. A recent review of the available data by Halleck and Witte (1977) addresses the twin questions of whether rehabilitative policies have achieved demonstrable success and whether punishment can be observed to act as a deterrence to crime. The philosophical arguments presented in this account must be set aside, not to minimize the importance of these arguments, but to draw attention to the practical accomplishments in the area, which can be documented. In its findings, this account is highly critical of some of the data that have been used to support a rejection of the rehabilitation thesis. In particular, it condemns the well-known study by Martinson (1974), which has provided the basis for much recent sentiment against the rehabilitative model, for applying overly strict criteria for determining whether correctional programs work. More to the point, Halleck and Witte criticize existing programs as inadequately designed to meet their objectives. Their conclusions are that, on the one hand, rehabilitative programs have yet to be discredited in principle and, on the other, that these same programs have not yet been given an adequate opportunity to prove their worth.

Third, there is evidence to suggest that crime rates in the United States are beginning to fall and will continue to do so for the next few decades. One hastens to add that this is probably a demographic phenomenon and owes little to the efforts of the crime control establishment. However, it would be too much to expect elements of this establishment not to claim credit for this development—if, indeed, it does materialize (Blackmore 1978). Regardless of whether such credit is awarded, or claimed, fairly, it seems very possible that the future will bring a lessening of pressure on the various agencies mandated to control crime. If this occurs, then theoretical developments in the field will have a better chance of being translated into practical applications that will result in success. Against this, if, as some viewpoints suggest (see Gibbons and Blake 1977), future crime rates accelerate, in response to worsening social conditions brought about by worldwide economic depression, the concept of rehabilitation may slide quickly into redundancy.

The Systemic Approach

A fourth variable, with implications for programs of higher education in the field both obvious and profound, is the increasingly systemic approaches now taken both to the study of criminality and its control, and to the administration of criminal justice agencies. This development represents a new commitment on the part of theoreticians to the application of their concepts in practical settings and to the kind of multidisciplinary, practitioner/academic alliance many writers in the field have advocated for years (see, for example, Jeffery 1977).

A traditional failure of public agencies concerned with crime control in the United States has been in the apparent absence of any mechanism for coordinating the activities of these agencies:

Turmoil, crisis, chaos—these are a few of the milder terms used to characterize the criminal justice system in the United States today. Terms like this are used by persons who are disposed toward a *sympathetic* view of the system, including many who work within the system itself; *critics* . . . employ much harsher expressions! Until recently, it was somewhat of a standard joke among criminal justice specialists to refer to a "criminal injustice nonsystem" (Vetter and Simonsen 1976: 1; see also Freed 1969).

Observations of this type are well known in the literature. The report on corrections issued by the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973a), for example, went to some pains to characterize the whole idea of a criminal justice system as a myth—a model considered to have an existence in theory rather than practice (pp. 5-6). The more general report of the same commission further emphasized this point in its discussion of *two* putative systems: System 1 includes those agencies formally charged with some aspect of crime prevention and control (the police, the courts, correctional agencies, and the prosecution function); System 2 is described as an informal group of agencies, both public and private, that perform a variety of social welfare functions. Reasonably enough, the commission considered this second system of vital importance in helping prevent crime (1973b).

However, discussion of the two systems serves, in fact, to point up the disparate nature of criminal justice organization in this country. If the first system is fragmentary, the second is all but invisible. Hence, any use of the term "system" in either of these contexts should include reference to the wide gap that separates appearance from reality. However, it is not merely the goals of efficiency and rationality that direct that sustained attempts be made to translate the systematic model into practice; there is evidence that different units within the "system" subscribe to rather different objectives, some of which conflict with one another. Correctional policies, which are presumably based on the idea of rehabilitation, might favor the diversion of criminals to supervised work-release programs. Such policies would conflict with those of the police, which emphasize crime control and prevention through deterrence (U.S. President's Commission 1967b; see also Vetter and Simonsen 1976). Coordination of policies between agencies is therefore essential if the administration of justice is to be carried out with any semblance of effectiveness.

The systemic approach is now firmly grounded in the literature dealing with the applications of criminological research. For example, one recent discussion of the practical achievements of criminology and criminal justice over the last decade implies strongly that such progress as has been made is largely attributable to developments in the latter of these two areas (Caplan 1976). Caplan describes progress in terms of organizational advances and suggests that the past ten years have seen great increases in the level of efficiency with which justice is administered, in the fairness of the judicial process, and in reductions in the costs of crime. He does not discuss any advances in criminology that have contributed, or may in the future contribute, to social policy. He does, however, quite justifiably point to the unrea-

sonable expectations, which persisted through the 1960s, of the ability of criminologists to devise theoretical approaches that could ultimately lead to the elimination of crime. Developments analyzed in this account are therefore, as in so many publications at the present time, those that emphasize the organizational and administrative achievements in the area; discussion of theoretical achievements is conspicuous by its absence.

Despite all this, there are a number of indications that the organizational approach, represented by systems theory, can in no way resolve fundamental problems of crime control. Resolution of such problems can only occur, if ever, after an appropriate body of theory has been developed and after the practical applications of this body of theory have been translated into public policy. Efficient management of resources should be complementary to, not a substitute for, objectives and policies that are theoretically sound.

Moreover, there are indications that the systems approach can in itself exacerbate existing conflicts between organizational objectives of units within the system. Martin Forst's discussion (1977), for example, includes a case study of a specific instance in which the objectives of efficient jail management are seen to be inconsistent with those of court sentencing policy. Effective allocation of resources, as an objective of the correctional system, is contrasted with the judiciary's overriding concern with due process. Forst's general contention is that too great a concentration on efficiency can result in the substitution of managerial goals for social goals. He warns:

One legitimate objective threatened by an increased reliance on the systems approach is judicial independence. It has been the hallmark of our constitutional system that responsibilities are distributed among discrete branches of government and that each branch functions independently. In searching for a more coordinated, planned, and effective criminal justice system, system analysis planners may tend to ignore the importance of preserving what is most basic to our constitution; often they seem willing to modify the character of the criminal justice system in the name of more efficient government. The benefits of applying the systems approach must be compared to the constitutional ramifications which any such application will have for the entire criminal justice system (1977: 412).

The kinds of arguments advanced by Forst and others do not advocate that the systems approach be abandoned. Rather they suggest that this approach be applied with care and that those concerned with it have the commitment, and the knowledge, that will enable them to balance social goals against immediate organizational objectives. For this reason alone, the growing popularity of the systems approach has important consequences for the education and training of present and future criminal justice personnel.

Gibbons and Blake, in their thoughtful review of recent theoretical developments in criminology and application of these to the study of criminal justice (1977), make the point that the latter is primarily a field of application. As such, it has no body of theory unique to it. Those involved with it must rely on other disciplines—primarily sociology—for theoretical explanations of the problems they face. The bulk of this discussion consists of an excellent survey of current theoretical issues in criminology and of schools of thought

generally considered to present alternative, and competing, explanations of the same phenomena. This survey is presented to make the very significant point that those concerned with practical aspects of criminal justice, who need to assess the policy implications of particular theoretical constructs, need a quite sophisticated knowledge of theory. It is therefore suggested that criminal justice as a practical art cannot reasonably be separated from the theory on which it draws so heavily.

The position taken by Gibbons and Blake has important implications for the form and the content of higher education in any aspect of the criminal justice field:

[W]e have stressed the theoretical content upon which criminal justice draws. But, is not criminal justice an applied field? Let us clarify our views on that issue. We agree with those who have advocated new forms of graduate education that will prepare graduates to *do* things, to perform important tasks in the real world of public policy. Thus we have no quarrel with the thesis that criminal justice education ought to involve program evaluation skills, program budgeting, program planning, criminal justice research and kindred topics that are usually given less stress in traditional criminology programs. At the same time, we assert that what the sophisticated criminal justice practitioner needs to acquire from his educational experience, *more than anything else*, is theoretical wisdom. We have no patience with those who employ "theoretical" as a pejorative term and who charge criminal justice graduate programs with being "too theoretical," for we do not think that criminal justice education ought to be centered about inculcation of pedestrian kinds of "how to do it" skills.

Criminal justice practice cries out for sophisticated analysts who can think creatively about how to bring about major alterations in social institutions such as schools or the world of work so as to reduce criminogenic pressures upon youths and adults. Graduate education ought to do more than equip graduates to fit into existing criminal justice agencies and to tinker with the *status quo*. One of the unequivocal conclusions that has been reached in surveys in recent years of existing responses to criminality is that most of them are ineffective. It is time to move beyond the intervention recipes and strategies of the 1950s, in the direction of truly innovative and imaginative criminal justice programs (1977: 25).

The issue addressed here is the specific one of what form criminal justice education at the graduate level should take and how it should be related to the academic study of theoretical concepts. This is an issue that has so far not been resolved. The question of the relationship between theory and practice in this field is currently the major stumbling block to the development of a consensus on what the objectives of criminal justice education should be and the kinds of curricula that should be adopted. As later discussion will show, if this question is a difficult one to reach agreement on in the context of *graduate* programs, it has proven almost insurmountable in discussions of educational objectives and curricula at the baccalaureate and community college levels. A full understanding of the difficulties involved can only be achieved by considering the historical background of the involvement of higher education in this area.

The Development of Higher Educational Programs in the Field

The early history of the relationship between colleges and the criminal justice field has been documented by a number of authors (Carte and Carte 1975; Debro and Siman 1978; Fabian 1965; Pelfrey 1978; Stephens 1976). For this reason, developments occurring prior to the mid-1960s will be given only very cursory treatment here.

The year 1908 is widely regarded as a watershed in this field because it saw the establishment of the first educational program designed explicitly for criminal justice personnel. This program, the Berkeley Police School, was the brain child of August Vollmer and was established with a direct connection to the University of California. This connection was formalized some years later, in 1916, when the Berkeley campus of this institution undertook to provide what were supposedly the first crime-related courses in the United States ever taught in a university setting (Pelfrey 1978). Recognition of such courses as an acceptable specialty of academic study came in 1923 when a bachelor's degree with a major in economics and a minor in criminology was awarded to a Berkeley policeman (Swank 1972).

Between the late 1920s and the end of the 1930s, a number of prestigious academic institutions established separate programs of study for criminal justice professionals, primarily the police. These institutions included the University of Chicago, the University of California, Indiana University, Michigan State University, San Jose State University, and the University of Washington. All these programs seem to have emphasized the administrative aspects of criminal justice in general, and police work in particular, and all appear to have included a strong training component in their curricula (Debro and Siman 1978; Pelfrey 1978; Swank 1972).

The period between the end of World War II and the middle of the 1960s has been characterized as one of "orderly growth" for educational programs in criminal justice (Foster 1974). The number of institutions offering specializations in this field expanded steadily over this twenty-year period and by 1965 there were some 64 colleges and universities involved in this area (IAC 1968). It has been suggested that this quantitative growth was associated with some changes affecting program content and objectives. Principal among these were the consolidation of criminal justice within the academic setting and the greater recognition of the importance of distinguishing between education and training as separate, if equal, academic functions (Foster 1974; Pelfrey 1978). However, it seems likely that such a distinction was not stressed quite as much as it should have been. Stephens (1976) notes that most of the growth that occurred in this period was, as in the period from the 1960s to the present, located in the community college sector, which has traditionally been associated with instructional programs of a more practical bent. He also notes that the major impetus for the growth that took place in the years immediately following the end of World War II came from the particular training needs of law enforcement agencies:

In the decade-and-a-half after World War II, a major force leading to a soon-to-be geometric increase in criminal justice education programs was the growth of

the concept of "minimum" training standards for police. The concept of statewide entrance and minimum training standards had begun with Vollmer and was revived at a meeting of the California Peace Officers Association at Palo Alto in 1945. It was 1960 before California's efforts culminated in establishment of the Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST), a few years after New York became the first state to initiate such standards. State after state quickly followed the New York-California lead setting the stage for the phenomenal growth of criminal justice education in the 1960s (1976: 99).

However, there is evidence that other fields within the criminal justice area were not altogether neglected at this time. A survey carried out in 1957 found that while law enforcement dominated education in the field at the community college level in number of programs, most criminal justice programs at or beyond the senior college level focused upon corrections (Germann 1957; Stephens 1976). A 1949 survey of the much smaller number of programs then existing indicated a more even distribution of them among the fields of police science, corrections, and criminology/sociology (Boolsen 1950; Foster 1974; Stephens 1976).

A rather interesting survey, sponsored by the Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training and published in the late 1960s, a period crucial in the development of higher education in this area, found that specializations in corrections and criminology at the senior college and post-graduate levels were still dominated by departments of sociology: "The close historical and intellectual connection between the study of criminology and corrections on the one hand and sociology on the other is already confirmed by the concentration of these programs in departments of sociology" (Karacki and Galvin 1968: 13). This study is, however, most significant because of its documentation of differences between established programs and those that had, presumably for the reasons outlined above, recently been instituted. Those in the latter category were observed to be much less likely to be associated with a sociology department or to offer courses at the graduate level.

One feature of this survey and the attendant discussion is the authors' emphasis on what appeared to be the different student needs addressed by the various types of program. The older programs, with their more intimate relationship to the parent discipline, are described as geared toward the needs of academic sociologists; the younger programs, toward the concerns of practice in the criminal justice field (Karacki and Galvin 1968). One commentary on this study and on the general question of the relationships among education, theory, and practice makes a number of observations on this finding. Prominent among these is the point that there are possible conflicts between theory and practice in criminology in general, but in corrections in particular. The contrast between the two is used to justify the necessity for the development of policies of higher education specifically designed to address the particular problems of the correctional field.

The need for an explicitly correctional body of knowledge and a professional group for the implementation of such knowledge seems to be one of the issues involving a direct confrontation of punitive law enforcement and the behavioral

science approach to crime. The entry of other established professions into correctional work does not necessitate such open confrontation to the same extent (Lejins 1968: 39).

Added bite to this point, and to the questions about the quality of program of an applied orientation and of the students in them raised by Karacki and Galvin, is given in the report of a study of faculty attitudes toward these programs (Esselstyn 1968). This study suggests that faculty hostility represents, or represented, a major obstacle to the development of criminal justice in the academic community and to the resolution of the particular problem in corrections to which Lejins refers.

More recently, discussions of developments in this area generally pay most attention to the *systemic* nature of criminal justice education, and the particular needs of elements within the system are not generally stressed. The educational needs of the police represent the exception that proves the rule, as discussion of these needs is the subject of a very large segment of the literature. Other specializations within the system have not been discussed to anywhere near the same extent. This can in part be explained by the current emphasis on the systemic approach, because those accounts that address the particular problems of non-police specialties tend to support this. Myren, for example, is critical of attempts to compartmentalize either the criminal justice system or educational programs for it.

[Such attempts] . . . inappropriately borrowed from the largely senseless division of academic subject matter in higher education into supposedly water tight compartments, [have] the unfortunate consequence of seemingly rationalizing a continued agency approach to criminal justice problems. That result is inconsistent with a growing trend to attempt the assertion that society has given the responsibility for formal response to crime not to any particular agency but to the criminal justice system as a system (1975: 51).

The conclusion reached is that education for corrections be fully integrated with that for other aspects of the criminal justice system.

Other discussions of correctional education have generally accepted this point and have focused upon the nature of the relationship between practice and university training, rather than on the curriculum content of correctional programs or on the desirability of maintaining separate curricula for those preparing for careers in this field (see, for example, Fox 1968; Joint Commission 1969; Waldo 1971). Other accounts have drawn attention to specific problems in this area. The question of what forms of education should be associated with what *levels* of job responsibility has aroused some concern and it has been suggested that:

One is hard pressed to find evidence that the field of corrections has during the past 10 years seriously tackled the job of defining the tasks for which higher education at specified levels is essential. What are the positions which should be occupied by graduate professionals, by students who have completed four-year undergraduate programmes, two-year community college programmes and programmes of technical institutes, and what tasks should be performed by each? What can corrections tell the educator about the content of the education re-

quired by graduates? It appears to be clear that unless there is a serious effort to maintain a continuing dialogue between the field of practice and the academic community, much of what happens in the latter may be wasteful and irrelevant to the real needs of correctional programmes (Moeller 1974: 32).

O'Leary (1976), in discussing the types and philosophical orientations of correctional programs currently in existence, makes a similar point in his observation that the varying structures and orientations of these programs mark an underlying dilemma of goals and objectives that has yet to be properly addressed. In fact, a dilemma of this kind is a common characteristic of criminal justice programs in general, a point to be documented in later discussion. Senna, in his paper (1976) dealing with the more specific question of education for probation and parole, provides further emphasis for this same point in noting that the educational paths taken by those entering these fields are even more varied. Although schools of social work are described as most commonly providing career education for probation and parole officers, Senna also notes the importance of a quite disparate group of disciplines (including law, public administration, criminal justice, and education) in this respect. His final observation is that there are in fact very little data that provide an indication of which type of education can be considered most appropriate for these fields.

Developments Since the Mid-1960s

The phenomenal growth of educational programs in criminal justice that has occurred over the last decade is very well documented. The number of programs grew from an estimated 64 in 1965 to almost 700 in 1973 and more than 1,200 in 1978 (Foster 1974; IACP 1968; Pearson 1978; Pelfrey 1978). The impetus for this growth is universally described as stemming from the emergence of crime as a major domestic issue in the United States, widespread public dissatisfaction with the performance of criminal justice agencies and the commitment of the federal government to the not inconsiderable goal of eliminating crime as a social problem (see, for example, Caplan 1976). There have been suggestions that the overhaul of the criminal justice system proposed at this time, and implemented in the years that followed, was poorly conceived and unrealistically carried out (Chelimsky 1975; Jacobs and Magdovitz 1977). It was, however, this massive commitment on the part of the federal authorities that was to a large extent responsible for the growth of higher education in this area and for the kinds of educational programs that have been developed.

Statements included in the reports of governmental commissions during the 1960s reflected the principle that the application of higher educational standards was the most significant way in which the caliber of criminal justice agency personnel could be improved and their functions professionalized. This point was made by the McCone Commission, investigating the 1965 Watts Riot, the Kerner Commission, on civil disorders, and the Walker Commission, on the causes and prevention of violence (Beckman 1976). There is little doubt that the opinions expressed by these commissions were

the result of a concern with problems larger than crime control. All these bodies were to some extent motivated by a desire to identify effective means for resolving the social difficulties and internal dissensions that beset American society in the period of the Vietnam War. However, as has been pointed out, the idea that specialized programs of higher education should be available to those concerned in some way with the criminal justice system has quite a long history (Stephens 1976). Moreover, federal recognition of this idea was given in the reports of the Wickersham Commission, published more than thirty years earlier (U.S. National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement 1931). This strongly endorsed the principle that police officers, in particular, should be encouraged to obtain the benefits of higher education.

It is, however, the recommendations included in the various reports issued, in 1967, by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and, in 1973, by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals that have been most influential in this area. The objectives and problems inherent in the notion that standards of education for criminal justice personnel should be raised substantially have to a large extent been discussed in terms of the recommendations made by these two commissions.

Most of the detailed discussion and body of recommendations relating to selection criteria included in the reports of the two federal commissions have not aroused a great deal of controversy. While the recommendations themselves may not have been followed by a large number of agencies, the principles reflected in them have not generally been challenged by academic researchers or by criminal justice administrators. The heavy emphasis placed in these reports on the need for high standards of educational attainment by criminal justice practitioners has been the subject of considerable recent discussion in the field. For example, in the general report of the earlier commission an unequivocal commitment to higher educational standards for officers at all levels of the police hierarchy was demonstrated and the following specific recommendations were made:

Police departments should recruit far more actively than they do now, with special attention to college campuses and inner-city neighborhoods. . . . The ultimate aim of all police departments should be that all personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees. . . . Police departments should take immediate steps to establish a minimum requirement of a baccalaureate degree for all supervisory and executive positions (U.S. President's Commission 1967a: 109-110).

Following this emphasis, recommendations were included that promotion eligibility lists should be weighted by educational achievement and that continuing education be a permanent feature of the officer's career. One very interesting feature of this report was the commission's view that education and training were inseparable components of the officer's ongoing preparation to meet the demands of his social role. Formal education in the traditional college setting was, of course, recommended. In addition, the commission perceived such education as being supported within the context of in-service training programs.

Professional educators and civilian experts should be used to teach specialized courses—law and psychology, for example. Recognized teaching techniques such as problem-solving seminars should be incorporated into training programs (1967a: 112).

The report of that task force of this commission that dealt with the police was rather more realistic in its goals. While maintaining the general goals noted above, the task force viewed them as desirable objectives, rather than as criteria for immediate implementation.

Hence, all future personnel serving [as police officers] should be required to have completed at least 2 years of college preparation at an accredited institution. While such educational requirements could be implemented in only a limited number of departments today, it is imperative that all law enforcement agencies strive to achieve these goals as quickly as possible. As an appropriate first step, all departments should immediately establish a requirement that no person be employed in a sworn capacity until he has received a high school diploma and has demonstrated by appropriate achievement tests the ability to perform successfully college level studies. . . . To assist departments in ultimately reaching desirable requirements, educational standards should be increased progressively as conditions permit. The ultimate goal is that all personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees (U.S. Task Force 1967: 126).

The later commission, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, maintained this same emphasis on educational attainment as a criterion for entering a police agency and advancing within it.

The standards [recommended] would require all police officers to have an undergraduate degree or its equivalent no later than 1982. In the meantime, the standards propose: immediately, all police officers should have at least 1 year of college or obtain 1 year of college within 36 months; by 1975, 2 years of college; and by 1978, 3 years of college (U.S. National Advisory Commission 1973c: 311).

This unambiguous commitment of the commission to the uplifting powers of the educational process is further indicated in suggestions that agencies make efforts to accommodate the needs of those attending courses in their scheduling, that pay incentives be given to encourage college attendance, that police administrators make liaison with educational institutions in their area in order to minimize the difficulties of officers taking classes, and that officers be encouraged to take courses in a broad range of disciplines and not to limit themselves to those in the criminal justice field (U.S. National Advisory Commission 1973d).

It is important that these recommendations be viewed in their correct context. Underlying them all is a strong commitment on the part of both these commissions to the development of a professionalized criminal justice system that is geared toward its social function as a service agency. Most reports of these commissions include detailed descriptions of the service responsibilities of the practitioner of the future and all make the reasonable assumption that these responsibilities can only be undertaken by personnel who are

professionalized, educated, and intensively trained to fulfill the obligations of their roles.

Probably the most significant feature of the recommendations regarding educational attainment made in the reports of these two commissions lies in their underlying assumption that the work of the criminal justice practitioner, as it should be carried out and as it will be carried out in the foreseeable future, is essentially professional. By this view, distinctions can be made between education and training of personnel, but such distinctions are intrinsically unhelpful. Both are interrelated aspects of an integrated system of advancement intended to instill the skills and attitudes characterizing those who are practitioners of a true profession. For this reason, police education and training cannot be considered in isolation from one another and policies intended to promulgate one must also be planned and evaluated in terms of their position within the overall structure of police advancement toward full professionalism. This point has been given emphasis in a number of accounts. Glisson (1976), for example, devotes his entire discussion to the point that there is no basis for conflict between those advocating more intensive training and those upholding the goal of increased educational attainment of police officers. Exposure to both is regarded as a fundamental precondition for professionalism.

Educators and trainers need not and should not be adversaries. They should (and most do) work in close cooperation to see that the police officer receives the finest training and education available.

It is true that educators and trainers have special needs and may emphasize different priorities; therefore, it is reasonable that educators and trainers will form specific organizations devoted to fulfilling those special needs and achieving different priorities. This, in no way, suggests an isolationist attitude by either group. It simply reflects a recognition of the difficulty of one organization actively pursuing the needs of two groups that often have different priorities. The goal is the same for both groups—police professionalism. Professionalism, however, cannot be achieved by trainers or educators alone. Each must pursue their mutually supportive objectives to ultimately achieve the common goal (Glisson 1976: 62).

The reasons generally advanced in support of the recommendations of the various federal commissions regarding mandatory higher education for criminal justice personnel can be grouped conveniently into two categories: those that support this level of education by assuming the benefit of it as a generally liberalizing influence on police agencies and those that suggest that it has specific, and identifiable, effects on job performance. Reasons in the first category are essentially the same as those used to support the extension of the privileges of higher education to any other group within society. Education at this level is regarded as having a generally uplifting influence on the values, personalities, and character of those receiving it and this influence is reflected in both the mental horizons and capabilities. Those who advocate higher education on these grounds are therefore simply extending a general principle relating to the beneficial effects of education and feel that this is a principle widely, if not universally, accepted within society. As such, this

idea is regarded as one that can be accepted at its face value, without being subjected to rigorous testing. Indeed, supporters of this view can, and do, argue that the qualities conferred by superior educational attainment are sufficiently diverse to defy meaningful testing.

One can justify requiring art, music, literature, on the grounds that a policeman, in his work, sees so much of the seamy side of humanity that he should have some acquaintance with the sublime and noble products of the human spirit in order to keep his sanity, balance and judgment. But these are not the real justifications; rather, we justify the requirements of liberal arts in law enforcement education on the grounds that they contribute in ways for which no substitute has been found, to the development of men as thinking, critical beings, with an awareness of their relations to the whole of mankind. We do this in the faith that this type of man is a better man—whatever occupation he pursues (IACP 1962).

However, most of those who advance such views also suggest that there are particular ways in which higher education can be directly relevant to the day-to-day work of professionals in any field of endeavor. Exposure to advanced study of any kind supposedly stimulates an intellectual curiosity and creates a flexibility in the individual's approach to the world that cannot otherwise be easily obtained. This flexibility, a valuable asset in a world of social flux and constant technological innovation is, in one sense: "the most efficient form of occupational training. Rapid change is hostile to narrow expertise and a curriculum that emphasizes breadth and flexibility may better equip students to meet unpredictable vocational demands" (Bressler 1967: 50).

The two arguments outlined above, both variations of the general belief that higher education has a value that is intrinsically beneficial, have been widely expressed in journal articles and monographs, as well as government reports, especially those published within the last decade. These arguments seem especially persuasive when applied in the context of discussion of the complexities of the police role and the exercise of skill and judgment required by the increased future emphasis on the service aspect of policing.

In addition, a number of specific advantages of developing an educated police force have attracted a good deal attention in the literature. These include the attainment of particular communication and cognitive skills and the development of police personnel with more appropriate moral and social values and a greater commitment to the democratic ethos (Sterling 1974). The effect of a college education as a process, rather than a product, is widely discussed as helping to liberalize the police by providing them with exposure to other subcultural influences and by helping in the overthrow of the well-documented police tendency toward clique-ishness. George Berkley (1969), for example, after discussing the relative advantages and shortcomings of schemes to educate the police in various European countries, concludes that the overall effect of this education is one of democratization. He also suggests that an important byproduct of the requirement that police attend college lies in the process through which officers are exposed to civilian influences and values. This is considered to have the probable effect of making officers more receptive to general social currents and values.

However, probably the most effective argument supporting college education as a mandatory requirement for entry into police work and subsequent advancement through the ranks is that presented in one of the reports resulting from Project STAR. In this, a series of future social developments in American society are analyzed and discussed in terms of their anticipated effects on the police role. Professionalization and advanced education for police are prescribed as appropriate responses for a number of the developments that are foreseen. In particular, this report noted that if police agencies fail to upgrade the education and training of their personnel, not only will they fall behind in their abilities to respond to social trends and to take advantage of new techniques, but their employees will be left behind in the general movement of the population toward professionalization and improved occupational status. Education is therefore necessary, if for no other reason than to enable the police to develop their expertise and social status at a rate comparable with that of the population they serve.

[T]he population of the United States is becoming more highly educated. An increasing proportion of the population has some college education and a college degree is becoming commonplace. Thus, the nation is entering an era in which the population served by the police will be more highly educated than the average policeman, unless job-entry standards for police recruits are raised. In effect what is happening is that the police are failing to keep up with the general upgrading of educational requirements in other occupations such as social work, teaching, and nursing, for example, where at least a bachelor's degree is required for entry. There is increasing recognition of the need in our society for *continuing* education in many spheres of activity, particularly those recognized as professions, that is, fields of work in which academic knowledge and education are required for entry. This recognition is based on the realization that the rate of growth of science and the knowledge it generates is such that existing knowledge becomes obsolete very quickly. . . . This idea of continuing education needs to be applied to police officers as well as to personnel in other professions. This is critical for at least two reasons: (1) the educational base to start with is lower since one can become a policeman with only a high school diploma in many police departments; and (2) the rate of growth of relevant knowledge will be very rapid since the application of science in this field is so recent.

Under the circumstances sketched above, it would seem essential for police departments to undertake at least the following: (1) raise the educational standards for job entry of police recruits to a level equivalent with other professions such as teaching, social work, and nursing; (2) provide opportunities for continuing education to those police officers who do not have at least the equivalent of a bachelor's degree; and (3) create professional schools where the relationship between the functions of the police and scientific scholarship can be established (California 1976: 115).

Policies regarding the selection, education, and training of police should therefore be regarded as a continuum. The ability of police forces to meet the demands made by their future position in society will depend to a large extent on the recognition by agencies of the importance of viewing these policies as integral to their growing commitment to their service function.

As this discussion suggests, the last few years have seen a very considerable, and perhaps disproportionate, number of efforts made to show that higher education has a beneficial effect on the job performance of criminal justice practitioners that is both substantial and demonstrable (for a review of these efforts, see Hudzik 1978). It can be argued that such efforts constitute something of a blind alley because the qualities one hopes a college education will instill are probably those that do not respond well to quantitative assessment. However, the fact that efforts of this kind have occupied such a prominent position in the literature is significant. As the large number of recent surveys of criminal justice education have shown (see, for example, Eastman 1972; Foster 1974; Hernandez 1975; Hoover 1975; Howard 1975; National Planning Association 1976; Pearson 1978; Tenney 1971), programs in this area are primarily implemented at the junior college level and, moreover, are predominantly geared toward the police function. For these reasons, debates concerning the distinctions that must be made between education and training, and the desirability of systemic educational approaches, are still vital ones in this field. The problems created by the lack of resolution to these, and other, debates will be considered in the following chapter.

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Chapter IV

Current Educational Developments in Criminology and Criminal Justice

Educational Objectives

The many growing pains associated with criminal justice education can be discussed in terms of difficulties that arose because of confusion over objectives and those that developed as a probably inevitable consequence of too rapid a rate of growth.

Precise descriptions of the *kinds* of educational experience that should be developed for those involved in, or intending to be involved in, the criminal justice system are included in the reports of neither of the prestigious federal commissions that supported the principle of education in this field, nor in the enabling legislation that provided the funds to put the principle into effect. Differences in educational philosophy are apparent in the various positions taken in reports of the National Crime Commission of the 1960s and the National Advisory Commission of the 1970s. These differences can be taken as useful barometers of changes in prevailing opinions about the types of higher education that should be advocated. On this question, the earlier commission was rather noncommittal. Although the detailed examination of the question of what curricula should include was identified as an important area for future research, it *was* suggested that purely vocational programs were not likely to be suitable. Its tentative position, in line with the philosophy that stresses education as an essentially liberalizing process, was that: "Until the educational needs of field officers are more fully evaluated, however, undergraduate programs should emphasize the social sciences and the liberal arts. The complex responsibilities and duties of police work require that field personnel understand their community and conditions which breed crime and delinquent conduct. This understanding can best be gained through a liberal education" (U.S. Task Force on the Police 1967: 128).

A similar position, stated much more strongly, is taken in an influential report sponsored by the American Bar Association: "Police agencies need personnel in their ranks who have the characteristics which a college education seeks to foster: intellectual curiosity, analytical ability, articulateness, and a capacity to relate the events of the day to the social, political, and

historical context in which they occur" (ABA 1973: 212). In advocating this viewpoint, the ABA made some effort to circumnavigate the miasma of confusion that has traditionally surrounded this subject. The report emphasized that higher education does not, in and of itself, represent the means for creating a good policeman or corrections officer. It assumed that college attendance encourages the blossoming of those qualities that make a good officer a better one.

This report was quite critical of both the quality and the vocational objectives of existing programs of criminal justice education. Although the value of vocational courses in improving agency expertise is recognized, it is suggested that such courses cannot be expected to have the liberalizing influences associated with the concept of higher education. Specialized criminal justice courses are not mandated in the recommendations made in this report, and it is postulated that the ideal curriculum would include traditional liberal arts courses, but would emphasize the social sciences most heavily.

It is interesting that neither of the reports cited above even mentions any of the quite staggering number of studies that have, albeit with little success, attempted to document the beneficial effects of education on criminal justice personnel. This apparent omission is, however, quite consistent with the implicit view, widespread in Western society, that education molds values and character and therefore confers benefits on the recipient that do not have to be empirically demonstrated.

In contrast, the 1973 federal commission reports go to some pains to cite some of the studies that have attempted to demonstrate the hoped-for effects of education in this way. The arguments presented in the ABA report are, in fact, criticized because they ascribe advantages to higher education that are not substantiated and that probably can never be proven satisfactorily. No attempt is made in this account to recommend the direction criminal justice education should take. In spite of this rather cagey position, the philosophy reflected in these federal reports is a long way from the traditional view of the benefits and objectives of higher education. Although education is strongly recommended, there is a defensive quality in these reports that is a far cry from the ambitious positions taken in earlier sources.

One can suggest that educational policies that have to be defended at every step will tend toward goals that are practical and incorporate benefits easily translated into job-related skills. There is a danger that the National Advisory Commission's focus upon the need to prove that educating criminal justice practitioners, or those who intend to become practitioners, produces precise and calculable benefits will be interpreted as an argument in favor of education with a vocational bias.

If there is conflict about the objectives of criminal justice education in the opinions of national governmental commissions, there is considerable ambivalence toward the very idea of an educated profession on the part of administrators in the field. On the face of it, the recommendations made by the several federal commissions interested in this topic have the support of a substantial proportion of criminal justice leadership. One study of upper echelon law enforcement personnel in Ohio indicated that most of those polled believed that only officers with at least two years of college should be

eligible for command positions (Eastman 1972). A later study of a similar population indicated a considerable degree of support for the federal commission recommendations, and a general consensus that those with baccalaureates were the most promising potential recruits. There was further agreement that recruitment policies should be aimed at those in this group (Eastman and McCain 1973). An additional finding, which supports the conventional wisdom that criminal justice administrators look most kindly upon vocational education, concerns the college backgrounds those surveyed preferred. In both studies, the feeling was expressed that "law enforcement" constituted the most suitable educational preparation for the field.

In spite of the apparently high level of support for the federal recommendations, it seems there is quite a difference between principle and policy. When the recruitment and promotions policies of agencies are examined, these recommendations are found to have had little effect. The most comprehensive recent survey of personnel practices in law enforcement indicated that the high school diploma remains the minimum educational requirement in an overwhelming proportion of agencies (Eisenberg *et al.* 1973). Only 6 percent of the sample mandated qualifications higher than this, and only one agency (presumably the same one quoted by the National Crime Commission in 1967) required entrants to have a bachelor's degree. Education beyond high school was used as a criterion for promotion by only 18 percent of the responding agencies. These findings have been confirmed by later studies. Both Stoner (1977) and Beckman (1975) found a similarly low commitment to education in the policies of the agencies they surveyed. This contradiction between stated belief and practice seems, therefore, to represent a general trend.

Even those committed to the view that higher education is essential for bringing about socially desirable changes in the structure and operation of the criminal justice system must contend with findings that suggest that the net effects of developing a more educated body of practitioners may not be wholly beneficial. Arthur Niederhoffer's (1967) study of police cynicism is widely quoted in this context. He suggests that one consequence of the many frustrations of the police role can be to encourage the experienced officer to retreat into a deviant "subculture of cynicism" as a means of coping with a reality in which virtue rarely triumphs and illusions are lost. The better-educated patrolman is thought to be more susceptible to induction into the subculture, because of his higher expectations and greater awareness of the contrast between the theory and practice of police work. Niederhoffer further suggests that personnel policies intended to attract the educated to policing may act to create a wedge of dissension between these officers and their less educated colleagues.

The police elite's enthusiasm for the benefits of education has obscured for them its negative effects: the envy and hostility it is spreading among the old-timers who lack the formal education to meet the proposed standards, and among the police students who, sometimes for twenty years, try to graduate from the same schools and gain promotion. This division along educational lines is most clearly revealed when a member of the force with little education succeeds in being promoted. Thenceforth he loses no opportunity to impress on his

college-trained subordinates the fact that he is their boss, though he never graduated from elementary school (1967: 31).

Niederhoffer's findings continue to attract attention in the literature. Replications of his study are popular research projects and the results of them are published with a regularity that is perhaps wearisome (see, for example, Raffky 1975; Regoli 1975). However, in the future, debate over the forms criminal justice education should take and the basic assumption that higher education produces a beneficial effect on practitioners in this field are likely to be influenced by very recent, and as yet unreported, findings that better-educated officers may be *more* susceptible to corruption (Grabin 1978).

These points are not easy to counter. In fact, if the structures of criminal justice agencies remain in their traditional, quasi-military molds, it is definitely arguable that the presence of large numbers of educated officers could serve to exaggerate some existing difficulties. One can suggest that it is unreasonable to consider policies of encouraging the development of educated practitioners in isolation from the structural characteristics and functions of the agencies within which they work. Social and organizational expectations of practitioners should be refined to make their jobs more functional, more manageable, and therefore more attractive to the kinds of persons likely to be an asset to the field. Education in this context should therefore be seen as both an expression and a concomitant of change.

Objectives and Educational Levels

One recent overview of issues currently of concern in criminal justice education pays particular attention to the related questions of the extent to which programs should emphasize education, as opposed to training, and how liberal academic institutions should be in granting credit for job skills acquired in courses conducted by training academies (Wiechman 1977). Overviews of this kind, and the discussions cited in them, suggest strongly that quite basic questions regarding the nature of the contribution of the academic world to the development of practice in criminal justice have not yet been fully resolved (see also Culbertson 1975a; Foster and Tatem 1978; Stephens 1976). In these discussions, the point (raised in Chapter III) that both education and training have a vital contribution to make to the criminal justice field is not at issue. The bone of contention is how much instruction, if any, should be carried out within the academic setting (Gross 1973; Sparling 1975). For all the many and persuasive discussions appearing in the literature in support of the unique contribution the educational process can make in this respect, the fact remains that there is a large body of opinion, within the academic world as well as among the criminal justice leadership, that actively supports the practical orientation of many supposedly academic programs. For example, a recent survey of the views of administrators involved with education for, and the practice of, criminal justice found support for this position (National Advisory Commission 1978; Sherman and Bennis 1977). A more dramatic illustration of this point was given in a series of workshops dealing with the general topic of higher education and the police conducted by the American

Academy for Professional Law Enforcement. The published proceedings of these sessions suggest that many of those involved in college teaching view the training aspects of many courses with favor (Neary 1978).

There are particular circumstances that account for this ongoing debate over the objectives of criminal justice education. As has already been pointed out, some confusion over these objectives is indicated in the different positions taken by the various commissions that have addressed the problem. It has been suggested that these different viewpoints actually reflect qualitative changes in public policy. A number of critical histories of the Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) have postulated that various federal commissions, which in the 1960s advocated the development of better educated criminal justice personnel, did so because of fears that arbitrary or repressive crime control tactics would further polarize an already divided society (Jacobs and Magdovitz 1977; Tenney 1971). In later years, it is thought, the rationale for criminal justice education changed, and with it the types of educational programs that were advocated: "It was only later, when political conflict subsided while street crime soared, that a liberal education offered as a curative for authoritarian tendencies became confused with a technical training that would improve arrest and clearance rates. . . . The original goal of democratizing the police was displaced in favor of professionalizing the police" (Jacobs and Magdovitz 1977: 3).

However, it is very possible that the major cause of debate lies in the different policies and objectives sought by educational programs at the various levels. Considerable differences exist between the academic orientations of two-year and four-year colleges and it is likely that a failure to appreciate the nature of these differences lies at the root of much of the conflicting opinion in the field. Regardless of how universities and senior colleges concerned with this area of education view themselves as dominating leadership positions in this field, the fact remains that the community colleges educate most of those who enter criminal justice service with a postsecondary education or who obtain such an education after entering the field (Hoover 1975; Jacobs and Magdovitz 1977).

Many criticisms of programs in two-year institutions are not generally applied to those at the senior college level. The basis of many of these criticisms lies in the nature of the close relationships between community colleges and criminal justice agencies, especially police agencies. It is often suggested that these relationships have had a seminal influence on the form of programs and on the kinds of courses offered. As one critic points out, most community college ventures into this field were initiated, or at least encouraged, by the support of local agencies (Stinchcomb 1976). The traditionally low supply of academics and administrators with a background in this area is thought to have resulted in too great a reliance on senior criminal justice personnel in the development of these programs. One particular consequence of this has been an absence of systemic concerns in this area of study. An undue emphasis on police operations has led to the development of programs at this level that are not only purely vocational, but also suffer from the disadvantage of focusing too narrowly upon law enforcement, at the expense of other components of

the criminal justice system. As an early report of the American Bar Association pointed out:

There is a great danger that the current effort to encourage police personnel to undertake college studies will result in the establishment of college-level programs of questionable value. Examination of the curricula of a number of the programs that have been established in recent years indicates that many of them have a strong vocational orientation. The subject matter covered relates, for the most part, to the techniques and procedures involved in the operation of a police agency. Because of the vocational nature of the courses, they are usually of interest only to police officers and, as a result, class enrollment consists almost exclusively of police personnel—often drawn from a single agency. Instructors are commonly individuals who are themselves police officers or who formerly served as police officers. Such programs obviously have the potential for contributing toward upgrading the quality of police service. But they do not meet the kind of need that has led to urgings that police undertake college work. At best, such programs constitute good training. At worst, they are lending status to an effort that serves only to reinforce the most parochial concepts prevalent in the police field (1968: 217-18).

In the early days at least, the lack of guidelines, resource materials, and accreditation standards compounded the problems of quality control. Two-year programs were drawn toward the vocational concerns of the agencies that were so influential in their development. Other factors conspired to restrict their horizons to the confines of the educational model. Genuine confusion about the national objectives for criminal justice education, which has, of course, existed across the entire educational spectrum, probably limited tendencies to experiment with new models. The temptation of easily obtained LEEP funds appears to have prompted some institutions to develop programs they had neither the expertise nor the inclination to plan properly.

However, the relationships between community colleges and local agencies were most influential of all in this regard. Nonetheless, it is easy to be hypercritical of this situation: "Some would criticize that the relationship often was too close and hence intellectually subverting; and it is true that some two-year programs became wholly owned subsidiaries of a police agency. But it must also be recognized that without clear evidence of in-service student support, the priority administrative decision to initiate new programs could not have even been finalized" (Stinchcomb 1976: 16).

Moreover, as Tenney has observed, there are very understandable reasons why community colleges in this field should have developed a vocational orientation: "It is probable that there are several reasons why a two-year program is likely to follow the training model. In general, it is simply easier to develop this type of curriculum. Many of the course offerings in a college training curriculum are at best no more than an expansion of the subject offerings of a police academy. They are readily available models from which to build" (quoted by Hoover 1976: 35).

If the problem is considered in more general terms, it becomes in one sense more manageable. Community colleges have always had a vocational orientation and this is, in at least one body of opinion, quite consistent with their philosophy and objectives (see, for example, Gleazer 1968). If it is gen-

erally thought that this orientation is unsuitable for present and future criminal justice personnel, then such programs should not be included in community college curricula. Just this recommendation is included in a long-awaited, and potentially controversial, report just (November 1978) issued by the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers. This recommends, among other things, that degrees in criminal justice should be offered by four-year institutions only (see also Maeroff 1978).

Recent work on the question of low standards and unsatisfactory objectives evidenced by criminal justice programs at this level suggests that these problems continue to exist (Logan 1975). It is also probable that the identity problems four-year programs have grappled with for some time, which they are only now beginning to overcome, are now much more troublesome at the community college level. There are still many who would defend the characteristics associated with a vocational and even nonsystemic orientation (see, for example, Gwynne 1976).

The relationship between education and training, which is hard to define at the best of times, is particularly difficult in the community college situation. One complication in this area is the recent advances many agencies have made in achieving college credit for certain courses in their in-service training program (Territo 1975). Although this trend is to a great extent a consequence of the increasing depth of many police training programs, it can serve to strengthen the vocational orientation of the community college.

Some changes do, however, appear to be in the offing. The preliminary report of the study carried out by Pearson and associates suggests that most of the future changes in the objectives of criminal justice education will occur primarily in the two-year colleges:

At this time, criminal justice is a field in which the faculty generally seems desirous of teaching in programs oriented in a Humanistic-Social manner. While this appears to be true, certain situations must be highlighted for they appear to have strong implications for the future. First of all, those in two-year programs have overwhelmingly indicated their desire to move their existing departments into this mode. However, those at four-year institutions, while moving in this direction, are doing so in a nearly negligible manner indicating that they are satisfied with their current situations. Thus, the impact of academe has already taken hold at the four-year level, with the field primarily defining itself into either the Humanistic-Social or Professional-Managerial approaches. The Technical-Vocational mode appears to have been abandoned in favor of the other two. However, it is at the two-year level that alterations may well occur, possibly bringing those programs more into line with the expectations of the larger academic community (Pearson 1978: 15).

Models of Development

Over the years, opinions on the objectives, structure, and course content of educational programs appear to have become crystallized within support for one or another of the several types of curriculum currently discussed in the literature. A considerable number of specific model curricula appear in the

recent literature on criminal justice education. Setting aside those representing descriptions of the existing curricula of particular institutions, which are often presented in a self-serving fashion by those who helped develop them, a number of thoughtful models remain. Those that address the needs of four-year or graduate programs can be discussed within the context of three distinct types. Each of the three represents a particular philosophical view of the nature of higher education, as well as of the particular needs of the criminal justice system.

The three models correspond to those labelled "technical/vocational," "professional/managerial," and "humanistic/social" by Pearson (1978). However, the classification that provides the basis for most published comparisons of them was developed by Tenney (1971). In this, an important distinction is made between two forms of applied education. *Training curricula* emphasize the immediate job environment of the practitioner or would-be practitioner. Despite Pearson's observations on the aspirations of community college programs in this area, a training bias is largely considered to be characteristic of curricula presently offered by institutions at this level. However, those of some four-year institutions are also to be determined by strictly vocational objectives. *Professional curricula* also display a job-related concern. The difference is that these focus upon theoretical and practical aspects of human behavior and interpersonal relationships (Tenney 1971). Curricula of this kind strive to develop theoretical skills that can be applied in situational contexts related to the management and operations of criminal justice agencies.

Professional curricula are therefore quite distinctive in terms of their objectives. These represent an explicit attempt to produce change within the criminal justice system, as well as in the capabilities of those who intend to work in it: "The educational experience is viewed as a distinct attempt to *professionalize* criminal justice by emphasizing a sophistication in interpersonal relations and the understanding of human behavior" (Beto and Marsh 1974: 37). In terms of their physical characteristics, programs of this kind are usually distinguished by their attempts to appeal to pre-service, rather than in-service, students and by the level of attention paid to the practical application of the subjects taught. Because of this, the internship has become an important element of many such programs (see, for example, Beto and Marsh 1974; Kirkham and Turner 1975).

Curricula with a social sciences orientation stand in marked contrast to the other two models. These have a strictly theoretical orientation; they do not attempt to develop skills or knowledge directly related to the performance of any job function, and, while they certainly aim at creating a greater *understanding* of the criminal justice system and its social role, their objectives do not include those of career preparation.

Debate over the relative merits of the three models is continuing and unresolved. No consensus over the objectives of criminal justice education, or the structural content of it, can presently be said to exist. As noted earlier, most, but not all, defenses of the vocational/training model occur in the context of the community college and, even then, there are many who would deny that the provision of task-oriented skills should be the main focus of

even a two-year curriculum. O'Leary (1976), for example, in discussing the particular topic of educational needs and trends in corrections, notes the importance of integrating the objectives and curricula of academic institutions at all levels. The view he emphasizes stresses the need to plan these curricula along a continuum. Colleges at all levels are seen as having similar objectives, which are geared toward the education, rather than the training, of students. O'Leary therefore presents the opinion that structuring of curricula within them should be done so as to facilitate the ease with which students can progress from one educational level to another.

The tendency exhibited in the literature over the last few years has been to vaunt the advantages of the professional model of criminal justice education. Many of the discussions taking this approach do so with a professed interest, not in denying the importance of theory and cultural values, but in combining the kind of integrative mix of theory and its applications recommended by Gibbons and Blake (1977) and discussed in Chapter III. One application of this reasoning recognizes the advantages of such an approach, but focuses on the professional model as a means of inculcating humanistic values that are socially desirable (Fike *et al.* 1977). This account recognizes the importance of developing in the student a knowledge of theory and methodology sophisticated enough to enable him to evaluate institutional goals and the alternative means that exist for their achievement. However, the provision of this kind of knowledge is regarded as a secondary objective. The primary objective of the kind of higher education advocated lies in its contribution toward the professionalization of the field and those in it:

At the most general level . . . professional education aims first at developing internalized standards of behavior, consensually validated on the basis of the agreed-upon norms within the profession. Second, it seeks to create an awareness and understanding of alternative methods of achieving these goals, depending on varying sets of circumstances and problems. Finally a professional curriculum endeavors to create a foundation of expertise in particular subject areas (Fike *et al.* 1977: 461-62).

Discussions of this kind tend to regard the achievement of professionalism among criminal justice personnel as a universally accepted goal. They often fail to recognize the existence of a substantial, if minority, opinion that regards efforts toward criminal justice professionalism as dysfunctional, in terms of the needs of society (see, for example, Skolnik 1966). This apart, one criticism of the professional model of education involves a kind of cost benefit analysis that weighs the inclusion of additional professional courses in the curriculum against the liberal arts courses, which must necessarily be sacrificed (Hoover 1975). Accordingly, a number of versions of this model, especially those that stress the inculcation of values, rather than methodological skills, emphasize the importance of basing this model within a liberal arts framework (see for example, Fike *et al.* 1977; Pelfrey 1978). Unfortunately, the questions raised in discussions of variations of this model do not altogether solve the problem of how its several objectives can be attained within a four-year curriculum. To graduate a student from such a program with a sophisticated knowledge of theory, theoretical applications, and methodology

would be an achievement in itself. To add to this the requirement that the student will be well grounded in the liberal arts might be construed as gilding the lily.

The social sciences model reflects the implicit assumption that the teaching of criminology and criminal justice is substantively the same as teaching in other fields within the social sciences. Programs of study are theoretical in their focus, are well grounded within the liberal arts, and make no explicit effort to prepare students for careers within the field. In fact, this model is the most traditional of all three and is a direct expression of the viewpoint, expressed in Chapter III, that the objective of undergraduate education is to instill values and, to a lesser extent, to provide the student with a broad base of knowledge that can be applied in any field of endeavor. The acquisition of technical, or even generalized, skills is not therefore given high priority in this model. Lee P. Brown, for example, suggests that criminal justice practitioners:

... do not need any special new courses which are uniquely distinguished from the liberal arts tradition; rather they need some materials sensitively communicated and illustrated to illuminate the real problems which confront [them]. The college need is for instructors competent in the humanities, and the behavioral and the physical sciences who can, in their course work, make constructive application of the concepts and generalizations of their knowledge to the field of criminal justice (1974: 120-21).

A number of criticisms have been made of the social sciences model and a review of these is included in Culbertson (1975a). Most of these appear to center on the failure of this model to provide the student with knowledge that can be directly applied to the problems he will encounter in his professional life. However, such criticisms can, in fact, be applied to college curricula in general, and not just to those in the criminal justice field. Their validity can only be determined by returning, once again, to the central question of what one considers the fundamental objective of a college education. The fact that there are several alternative answers to the question does not help in the resolution of the problem. Supporters of the social sciences model do not, presumably, see allegations that programs that follow it fail to provide knowledge that can be applied immediately as criticisms. For them, the advantages of this model lie in its conferral of benefits that are less readily apparent and that come, moreover, in the long haul rather than the short run.

Proponents of the professional model have been made aware that the implementation of this model has had particular consequences. First, this model can be criticized for promising a variety of goods that appears impossible to deliver. As noted earlier, the objectives of providing theoretical, methodological, and applied knowledge, together with a liberal arts grounding, do not conflict in a philosophical sense, but seem hard to rationalize within the limited time frame of a college program. This reflects the unique situation of many criminal justice curricula, which, unlike their more established counterparts, attempt to achieve professional education at the undergraduate level. It is possible that this is too ambitious an undertaking. As Tenney observes: "[N]o sophisticated individual would presume that the holder of a

baccalaureate degree with a major in psychology, or sociology, or English, or history is particularly professional in these fields. His professionalization will come, if at all, in graduate school and beyond" (1971: 6).

A third point concerns the frequent antipathy that criminal justice programs have encountered within the academic setting. Hostility on the part of faculty and administrators in other disciplines is often cited as a contributing cause of many of the growth problems new programs have encountered (Culbertson 1975a; Esselstyn 1968; Karacki and Galvin 1968; and Lejins 1968 and 1970). Poor quality of criminal justice faculty, lack of acceptance of the need to educate practitioners, and unwillingness to recognize the field as a respectable academic discipline are frequently cited as reasons for this hostility. It is also possible that what are perceived as overly ambitious objectives contribute to the difficulties criminal justice programs have had in gaining peer group acceptance.

The latest major entrant into this debate, the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers, has resurrected a model of criminal justice education that has not been popular in recent years. In its 1978 report, the commission subscribes to a quite traditional version of the social sciences/liberal arts model and suggests that the focus of programs in this area should be on moral issues and the results of social science research. It is further recommended that majors be broad, with no more than one quarter of all course work devoted to criminal justice. The philosophy of this report is indicated by the recommendation that criminal justice majors at the community college level be abolished. This position represents a total rejection of the notion that such education should have even a minimal commitment to providing strictly job-related skills (see also Maeroff 1978).

Discussion over appropriate curriculum models continues unabated. As Fike and associates have noted: "Each of these categories has its advocates (and even zealots), as well as its detractors" (1977: 457). Whatever the outcome of this debate, one can be sure that it will not be reached quickly or easily.

Criminology, Sociology, and Criminal Justice

It is ironic that the traditionalist viewpoint noted above has for many years dominated the teaching of criminology. Earlier in this account, some attention was paid to the emergence of criminology as a subdiscipline of sociology as a largely North American phenomenon. Worldwide reviews of the development of this subject in academic settings within different societies emphasize the distinctiveness of the sociological approach, which has, until recently, dominated the teaching of criminology in the United States (Pinatel 1956; Radzinowicz 1961; Szabo 1964).

One consequence of this approach has been to create a tradition in which the subject has been taught within a standard liberal arts framework. It has emphasized theoretical knowledge and, until the fairly recent resurgence of interest in the sociology of law occurred, primarily limited itself to the study of the etiology of crime. The study by Karacki and Galvin (1968), carried out just before the maelstromic advent of criminal justice in the world of higher

education, indicated that the interest of most students taking criminology courses was in sociology, rather than in criminology as such. Very few such students were considering careers in the field and were not encouraged to do so by their instructors. Criminology was found to be taught and studied by those who saw the examination of crime and deviance as a standard sociological approach to the general study of social structure.

The finding of Karacki and Galvin reflects the traditional, and continuing, position of criminology in the college curriculum. Other studies confirm the well-established place of the subject within the broader field of sociology. Surveys carried out in the early 1940s (Kennedy and Kennedy 1942) and in 1970 (Reid and Bates 1971) suggest that over this thirty-year period, criminology maintained its position as a standard and popular specialty within its parent discipline. In both surveys, the subject was found to be offered in most undergraduate curricula, and such courses rated highly in lists of most offered courses (see also Kratcoski 1972).

A more extensive survey, covering the teaching of sociology in the United States at all levels within higher education, was carried out in the early 1960s (Sibley 1963). This found criminology to be quite well represented in graduate courses of study. Of 48 departments of sociology identified as offering programs leading to higher degrees, almost half provided courses in criminology. One of these departments was indicated as offering a master's degree in this subject.

Those published discussions advocating that criminology should continue to be located within this academic structure generally do so on the basis of two principal arguments. The first of these reflects the position (noted at various points in this paper and most recently stated in the commission report dealing with police education) that a liberal arts education provides the best preparation for any professional career. In this view, undergraduate teaching of criminology within the traditional liberal arts framework therefore constitutes an appropriate level of preparation for those who intend to enter the field after graduation, as well as those who do not:

Criminology as taught to undergraduate students is likely to emphasize fundamental questions of phenomenology, history—intellectual and empirical—philosophy and jurisprudence; and the "works-of-great-thinkers" approach rather than the narrowly pragmatic. It is precisely this sort of criminological teaching which can be done most profitably in a setting which also acquaints the student with major writers in other peripheral but related disciplines: an acquaintanceship not as easily come by in other than a liberal arts program (Sylvester 1975: 112-13).

The second kind of argument presented in support of the maintenance of criminology within the larger discipline of sociology stresses the importance of considering deviance and crime in the context of normative social structures. Those who present this viewpoint refer to recent trends in both disciplines as tending toward the examination of the social context of crime itself and of the social institutions used to define and control it. (An outline of these trends is included in Chapter III.) Viewpoints of this kind are implicit in much of the recent sociological and criminological literature and a focus upon the

social structure within which crime occurs is a common characteristic of original research recently carried out, whether from a radical (Harring and McMullin 1975, for example) or a neo-Durkheimian (Erikson 1966) perspective.

Taken one step further, this argument can be used to claim that criminology needs to *strengthen*, rather than to dilute, its sociological orientation:

A change of emphasis to a true sociological one would open new horizons to criminological research problems and would demand new approaches contents [sic] for the teaching experience. As an example of enrichment of the research horizons, let me mention the new problematic arising from the administration of justice. Traditionally, a description of the system would be enough, and an understanding of the system would be taken for granted. A new approach will examine its philosophy and its instrumentation, and will pose the following questions: Does it really satisfy the needs of our society? Does it comply with and ensure justice in society? If it fails in its mission, to what extent does it negatively affect the social interest of the members of that society? To what extent does it act as a criminogenic agent? What sectors of society receive the impact? (Calder 1975: 159-60).

Criminologists and others opposed to the continued domination of the subject by its parent usually support the ongoing theoretical development of the field, but stress the necessity for applications of it being included in the academic structure. A major statement of one version of this view is presented by Denis Szabo (1964), who takes the position that criminology is, despite its reliance on the theory and findings of other social sciences, an independent scholarly discipline. It has its own body of theory, he maintains, and future developments within this theory should largely come from within criminology. However, he goes to some lengths to emphasize the importance of developing a normal academic structure within which this theory can be *applied* and, in this context, describes the history and objectives of the Department of Criminology of the University of Montreal.

Szabo's main point is therefore that criminology can become the basis of a profession which uses the theory of this discipline to support praxis: "[T]he professional training of all those concerned with social protection will be based on criminology, just as the training of those responsible for the care of the individual and public health is based on medicine" (1964: 17).

From one perspective, Szabo's discussion provides an interesting commentary on the confusion that is brought about by the lack of precise definitions of concepts in this field. As Debro and Siman point out, writing at the end of 1978, there are still disagreements among those accepted as major scholars in this area as to how the terms *criminology* and *criminal justice* shall be defined. Many of Szabo's observations in his 1964 discussion could be interpreted as a defense of the educational approach, which stresses criminal justice; his use of the concept of "applied criminology" is, in this sense, ambiguous. However, Szabo makes quite clear the point that the theory of the field should continue to stem from criminology, while the teaching of both theory and practice should be systemic.

In a later discussion, Szabo goes further than this in maintaining that the

conceptual nature of criminology has changed. Criminology theory has combined with the strategy of public policy; social needs for the applications of theory have produced a shotgun marriage between criminology and "social defense."

Thus, a certain amalgamation is taking place among these various traditions born at the cross-roads of medico-psycho-social sciences (classical criminology), on the one hand, and of penal law, political and administrative sciences and legal sociology (social defense movement), on the other hand. This amalgamation of interests makes of the criminology of the last third of the XXth century, a political and social science whose objectives of applied research aim not only towards discovering new and efficient methods of treatment for adult and juvenile criminals, but also towards drawing up an instrument for planning and adjusting the whole apparatus of social protection to the changing needs of a society in rapid evolution. . . . Thus we witness the consolidation of the concerns of traditional scientific criminology with those of social defense movements. Criminology becomes an applied science called upon to contribute to a social policy aimed at a more rational modernization and management of the administration of justice. This is a three-dimensional discipline: the criminal and his rehabilitation (psychological and clinical criminology); crime conducive societies and policies of social defense (sociological criminology and policies of economic and social improvement); the system of criminal justice and its rational administration (operational research, and administration and planning of justice) (Szabo 1975: 121).

Some attention has been paid to Szabo's views because these probably represent the most extreme conception of an integration between criminology and criminal justice. There are, in addition, very many criminologists who would support the position that most college teaching and research in criminology should be undertaken within a criminal justice curriculum. For instance, Kratoski (1972) firmly supports the principle that criminological theory should be at the heart of any such curriculum. However, he sees a proper balance between theory and its applications as being the key to the success of such programs. Jayewardene (1975) suggests that criminologists have traditionally ignored the applications of their research findings and recommends that study of the subject be integrated with these applications, as well as with theory and findings taken from related areas. Newman (1975) takes a similar position and goes further in stating the view that the concern of criminologists with the applications of their work be extended to the *training* of line personnel.

The weight of opinion seems therefore to be that the bulk of academic involvement in criminology should be within the structural context of criminal justice. However, this is not to say that this opinion will carry the field. Resolution of this question brings us back once again to the more fundamental issue of educational policy in general. There is a case for returning to the old system of concentrating teaching of criminology in departments of sociology and another for continuing the present trend toward relocating a high proportion of such teaching in a department of criminal justice. Most opinion in the field *does* advocate the latter policy. However, the argument cannot be resolved by the expedient of "counting sacks of peanuts." Long-term policy

decisions will be strongly influenced by assessments of the relative advantages of the liberal arts model of American education and the professional model advocated by supporters of the systemic approach. At the graduate level, decisions of this kind may well be determined by theoretical developments within criminology and within theoretical disciplines related to it by blood or marriage. As most existing criminal justice programs are, at best, still in their adolescence, it is also likely that future changes in their policy orientations will strongly influence the place of criminology in them.

Movement toward Evaluation and Accreditation

Discussions of the tremendous growth in criminal justice programs almost invariably describe this growth as occurring as a consequence of the injection of federal funds into the area following the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968. Some writers do consider the operation of other factors in bringing about this unprecedented growth. Foster and Tatem (1973), for example, suggest that the importance of readily available LEEP funds in stimulating academia to develop such programs, and students to demand them, may have been exaggerated. They suggest that LEEP monies have not been substantial enough in themselves to have brought about this development and present the view that the current popularity of the field "is primarily a result of a legitimate academic response to a field in need of college-educated personnel, and that the offerings are academically sound and recognized as areas of inquiry sufficient to merit this interest" (1978: 3).

This is very much a minority opinion. While many writers do cite such factors as the recommendations of the various commissions, and growing institutional recognition of the need to implement them, it is the stimulus of massive amounts of federal money that is usually given pride of place (see, for example, Adams 1976; Balboni 1977; Chelimsky 1975; Fabianic 1977; Hoover 1975; Jacobs and Magdovitz 1977; Moran *et al.* 1977).

The point is of quite some significance because current discussions that refer to it do so, almost without exception, in the context of documenting the need for quality control of criminal justice programs of higher education. It seems to be now generally accepted that this growth occurred without adequate monitoring by LEAA or, in many cases, by the colleges and universities sponsoring programs in the area. It is suggested that many institutions, attracted by one of the few areas of plenty in a general academic famine, took advantage of the situation to expand far beyond their capabilities (Mark 1975). In this context, the guidance offered by LEAA has been subject to intense criticism and the failure of this agency to establish effective program guidelines is frequently commented on (for example, Erikson and Neary 1975; Logan 1975).

Leaders in the field have expressed their disapproval of LEAA for awarding money in so cavalier a fashion and of unscrupulous colleges for taking it in no uncertain terms. Charles Rogovin, former LEAA director, is quoted as referring to the LEEP program as "goddamn fraud. These men and women are being given what is alleged to be a college education, and in many cases it is nothing more than vocational training. They're deluding thousands of these

poor bastards into thinking they're getting a college education. It's a disgrace" (Jeffery 1977: 284). Gordon Misner, former president of the ACJS, observed: "The infusion of LEEP money has brought into being the greatest number of harlots the world has probably ever seen. An awful lot of hustlers, and some college presidents serving as pimps, are all looking for the LEEP dollar. In fact, I think what is going on now in criminal justice higher education is perhaps the most scandalous thing in the history of our education" (quoted by Maeroff 1978: 20).

The point is generally taken. More and more, discussions in the field take the need for evaluation of programs for granted and concentrate on how evaluation guidelines should be established and what areas they should address.

Particular issues frequently raised in this context include the related areas of theoretical development of the field and improvement of faculty expertise. As mentioned earlier, the lack of an academically qualified faculty is considered to a large degree to have been responsible for the atheoretical nature of many college courses and the hostility of more traditional academic disciplines to emerging programs and departments of criminal justice (see, for example, Foster and Tatem 1978; Lejins 1968). Peer criticism of criminal justice faculty from their colleagues in other disciplines may have been stimulated by envy, but has been shown to have a basis in fact. The latest study to demonstrate this found the theoretical level of undergraduate courses in the field to be influenced strongly by the qualifications and backgrounds of faculty teaching them. Faculty with weak academic backgrounds, substantial agency experience, and/or part-time status were associated with courses of a low theoretical content (Sherman and McLeod 1978).

Recognition of these factors has combined with what is probably a natural process of maturation to bring about increased interest in education at the doctoral level. In this sense, criminal justice is therefore moving toward a traditional academic model. Many of the published overviews of the field and its historical development emphasize the importance of developing programs at this level, both to improve the quality of teaching and to formalize the connection among instruction, research, and theoretical development (Kuykendall 1977; Stephens 1976). The importance of doctoral study as a source of theoretical and methodological development, rather than professional advancement, is given some attention in the recent report of a group of institutions exclusively concerned with the role of the doctoral program in criminal justice (National Criminal Justice Educational Consortium 1976).

In sum, many of the problems in this area of education are attributable to growth pains. As one commentary points out: "Criminal justice education was virtually not permitted to have an infant stage in its growth and development. The field emerged as an awkward, gangling adolescent. As long as the student enrollment continued to increase, little attention was paid to the need to develop a sound philosophical rationale to guide the development of the field" (Bassi and Rogers 1976: 244). Difficulties associated with this growth have included the use of marginally qualified faculty (Culbertson 1975b; Fox 1968; Jacobs and Magdovitz 1977), poor control over the disbursement of LEEP monies (Twentieth Century Fund 1976), div. . . of these funds from

the programs for which they were intended (Bassi and Rogers 1976), lack of quality control standards (Misner 1975), an unwarranted emphasis on vocational training (Hoover 1975), and too narrow a focus of concentration (Brandstatter and Hoover 1976). Although confusion over objectives, discussed here as a major unresolved problem in the field, was probably exacerbated by all these difficulties, this confusion appears to stem from conflicting mandates and educational philosophies.

Current discussions generally accept the need for quality control as given and address the problem of the form such control should take. There are excellent reasons why colleges, as well as criminal justice agencies and other institutional consumers, should be in favor of more rigorous standards. Marginal programs have good reason to fear future limitations on the availability of federal funds and the increasing unwillingness of criminal justice agencies to cooperate with institutions offering programs of low quality. Every incentive exists for them to make demonstrable efforts toward quality control. There is some evidence to support the existence of such concerns. The results of one recent survey indicate that commitment to the vocational model is presently in decline (Pearson 1978). Responses to a questionnaire sent to 146 colleges in 37 states and two foreign countries suggested that movement toward the "humanistic/social" and "professional/managerial" models was either an accomplished fact, or was planned, in most of the institutions surveyed. Of the two prevalent models, the humanistic approach seemed to have become most popular, a trend that has interesting consequences for the perennial debate over curriculum objectives.

Most recently, discussion has progressed from reasoned statements of the need for evaluation (Fabianic 1977), to models for curriculum development (Adams 1976; Kuykendall and Hernandez 1975), to suggested techniques for carrying out the process of evaluation (Knowles and Timko 1974; Moran *et al.* 1977). Present debate of relevance to this question centers on the relative advantages of specialized accreditation.

Most discussions of accreditation as a possible mechanism for ensuring program quality is very much in favor of the idea. Ashburn, for example, advocates accreditation as the only means of enforcing the achievement of particular characteristics associated with educational quality. His primary concern, however, is to document a view of accreditation as a means of professionalizing criminal justice occupations. He draws an analogy between criminal justice and the established professions to suggest that "If law enforcement and criminal justice, as an occupational field, is to become a profession in reality rather than rhetoric, then it must begin to assume some of the characteristics of the more widely accepted professions" (Ashburn 1975: 48). Accreditation is therefore supported for the larger end of upgrading occupational status. The immediate end of improving academic quality appears to be subordinated to this.

Misner (1975) makes the compelling point that specialized accreditation is necessary because institutional accreditation (of colleges rather than individual programs) has, like the guidelines laid down for the disbursement of federal funds for criminal justice education, proven incapable of ensuring even minimally acceptable standards. Other accounts, in documenting the

rise of the accreditation movement in this area—and the relationship of the American Society of Criminology, the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, and the Joint Commission to it—appear to take the advantages of this form of quality control for granted (Debro and Siman 1978; Foster and Tatem 1978; Wiechman 1977; see especially Bassi and Rogers 1976 for a detailed account of this relationship). These accounts generally express concern that the accreditation mechanism be subject to the joint influence of practitioners as well as academics—a concern that is, of course, reflected in the organizational background of the Joint Commission on Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards.

A few cautionary voices have been raised. Fabianic presents a view not enamored of the close involvement of practitioners in the accreditation process: "As other disciplines have discovered when working with external agencies for support or approval, there comes a time when the master becomes the slave, and the educational program becomes more responsive to the suggestions of the outside agency than to its own legitimate concerns, those of its institution, or sound educational policy" (1977: 15). The implication is that criminal justice education, which has often been accused of too vocational an orientation, is especially vulnerable to this possibility. Felkenes (1977) sees this as a potential danger and comments that many programs conform closely to agency expectations in order to secure funding—presumably in the form of increased numbers of in-service students and consequently greater accessibility to federal money. He also points to the continuing fragmentation within what is supposedly a systemic field and suggests that this is likely to increase the difficulties of formulating and applying guidelines.

A number of writers note the potential problems of attempting to formulate and apply universal guidelines to programs of varying types and academic levels. They warn that such guidelines should be rigorous, yet flexible enough to permit diversity and innovation (Fabianic 1977; Misner 1975). The proposed guidelines developed by the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences have recognized this principle.

In developing the . . . guidelines, the [ACJS] committee recognized the existence of two conditions which would have a pronounced effect on its work: that each institution faces similar problems and conditions from time to time and that all institutions have unique relationships with their constituent bodies leading to special responsibilities. Therefore, the committee has attempted to set forth guidelines which are specific where possible, and general where necessary (1976: 2).

The content of the guidelines themselves, and their potential success as structures for coping with the vital questions of faculty qualifications, faculty development, and curriculum, are the subject of continuing study and debate. (A history of their evolution and development is included in Bassi and Rogers 1976; an outline of the reasoning behind their formulation is given in Misner 1975.)

It is apparent, however, that the value of these, or any other, guidelines in this area will depend to a large extent on how well they can, in practice,

incorporate the disparate objectives of many academic programs. Ultimately, the success of the accreditation movement will be determined by the willingness of educators in the field to come to terms with the basic problems of definition that still characterize criminal justice education.

Conclusion

One outstanding feature of the literature, as reviewed in this paper, is the serious lack of agreement on basic issues that still prevails. Quite strong differences of opinion occur on questions concerning the fundamental *direction* higher education in this area should take. Academics are even divided in their opinions of what general objectives educational programs should attempt to address: the needs of the present or future criminal justice administrator? the policy-maker? the researcher? the academic? the line officer? anyone who wants a good education? All positions have their advocates and adherents who accordingly subscribe to one or another of the several suggested curriculum models. There are even some, and perhaps a great many, who see the college as little more than an extension of the training academy. A few of them are academics and write for publication in professional journals.

Criminology is affected by this atomized collection of viewpoints in that it has a disputed degree of commitment to the future academic development of criminal justice. The extent of this commitment is determined by some troublesome factors. One is that future decisions about how applied a discipline criminal justice should be will determine how criminology is to be incorporated in it. Another is more subjective and will perhaps influence the individual viewpoints of criminologists themselves: Should a criminologist really be at ease in the position of having to uphold an institutional structure he is supposed to be examining in a dispassionate fashion? How objective could a criminologist in such a position truly be? A third unanswered question relates to the theoretical orientation of criminology: How far should criminology be integrated with the study of the operation of specific institutions and how far should it be included in the study of social structure in general?

These questions are still unresolved. Their existence indicates that it is not just the field of criminal justice that is plagued by disagreement on seminal issues.

Quality control has become a *cause célèbre* in concerned educational circles. One can generalize in saying that the level of agreement of affected parties on its necessity is comparable to their probable concurrence on the question of virtue. All are in favor of it, but few can agree on how it can be encouraged. Unanswered questions in this area include: When do experimental programs become ripoffs? How can one evaluate a program in the absence of general agreement on what its objectives should be? Until the basic problem of the preferred curriculum/curricula is solved, evaluation efforts may turn out to be at least mechanical, operating on quantifiable variables such as percentage of faculty with PhDs, library facilities, etc.

It has yet to be proven that the guidelines that have been developed will be successful in their objectives. The danger is that in their application they may

become so general as to be little better than those mandated in the generalized accrediting process colleges have accepted for many years. As the discussion in Chapter I indicated, there is evidence of increasing federal efforts to determine the quality of the programs funded with public money. As many of these efforts are very recent, it is as yet uncertain how far they will subsume those of specialized accrediting agencies. Moreover, there are no data to indicate the extent to which the *principle* of specialized accreditation has been accepted in the criminal justice field. The discussion of the efforts of public administration in this regard, included in Chapter II, suggested that most academic opinion in this field was *against* specialized accreditation. Polls eliciting opinion on the desirability of specialized accreditation from educators in the criminal justice field should have been taken long ago.

A number of accounts provide justification for the designation of the ACJS as the appropriate accrediting agency (Bassi and Rogers 1976; Misner 1975). Again, it is uncertain how far this justification is accepted by those in the field. As a recent membership profile suggests (Culbertson 1978), this organization is mainly composed of *practitioners*. In terms of the two examples discussed in Chapter II, the suggested accreditation structure of criminal justice is therefore closer to law than to public administration. Some of the possible disadvantages of a structure of this kind have been noted in Chapter II and in the quotation from Fabianic (1977) above. Once again, the absence of data bearing upon criminal justice education directly means that we have no way of knowing whether those in the field who support accreditation in principle in fact support recognition of the ACJS as the appropriate accrediting body.

Many of the overall problems of criminal justice education stem from the broad spectrum of programs covered. As this paper has indicated, discussions cover those ranging from the two-year to the doctoral levels. In this, criminal justice differs from most aspiring professions, which limit discussion of professional programs to those at the graduate and, occasionally, the baccalaureate level. The two occupations discussed in Chapter II are therefore more typical in this respect. Recognition of this point is included in the recommendations made in the report of the National Advisory Commission on Higher Education for Police Officers (1978). This suggested that criminal justice education below the baccalaureate be de-emphasized.

However, there is little general recognition in the literature that programs at different levels will, because of this alone, have quite different objectives. However, as Brandstatter and Hoover point out (1976), community colleges are explicitly recognized in federal legislation and funding formulas as committed to technical and vocational preparation. At the opposite end of the spectrum, doctoral programs are, usually, committed to nothing of the sort, but are in existence primarily to stimulate theoretical development and to a lesser extent to promote values (Czajkoski 1978). The greater attention now paid to graduate education in criminal justice promises to encourage more sustained interest in theoretical concerns, as well providing a larger pool of talent from which better-qualified faculty can in the future be drawn. However, one still finds many published discussions that give the appearance of criticizing four-year and graduate programs on the basis of observations that

relate primarily to community colleges.

One can be confident that events in the immediate future will compel many colleges to rethink the forms their involvement in criminal justice should take. General public awareness of the deficiencies of many programs in the field may well serve to limit the supply of the very funds that created these programs in the first place. Failing crime rates (if these do in fact continue), general cutbacks in public expenditures, and growing public conservatism on matters such as prisoner rehabilitation and crime control may all combine to reduce the funds available for criminal justice education. The consequent thinning of the academic ranks could serve to clear the air on many issues and allow essential questions to be discussed more openly and more informatively.

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